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FOREWORD
We have long known that helping allies build better armies and police forces is a key to regional stability and the exit strategy for costly missions like Afghanistan in an “as they stand up, we stand down”
approach. Yet the U.S. track record on this is unacceptably weak. The 2012 coup in Mali was staged by U.S.
trained Malian soldiers. In Afghanistan, after years of
training, the Pentagon assessed that only one of the
Afghan National Army’s 23 brigades is able to operate
independently. This does not augur well for U.S. troop
withdrawal in 2014 or for the future of Afghanistan.
Nor is the United States alone. The United Nations
has suffered similar setbacks in East Timor, Haiti,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where
ill-trained security forces have staged coups, preyed
on the civilian population, and necessarily elongated
costly peacekeeping missions. There are many reasons for these failures: Building professional security
forces in conflict affected countries is hard to do; there
is a significant theory to practice gap on how to do
it; there are no comprehensive practitioner guides or
field manuals; and few practical models exist. Worse,
the de facto “train and equip” approach is ineffective,
as it focuses too much on tactics and techniques and
misses important intangibles.
This monograph fills a timely gap in our knowledge of security sector reform and offers a unique
model to accomplish it. Liberia was once the epicenter
of conflict and human rights abuse in West Africa, frequently at the hands of the military. Ten years later,
Liberia is stable and even sending a peacekeeping
contingent to Mali. This makes an excellent case study
in how to build an army, as told by the program’s ar-
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chitect. The author’s frank and critical analysis provides key insights into improving the U.S. capabilities
in this crucial yet underserved area.
The author explains that a state must have the monopoly of force to uphold its rule of law. The two tools
to accomplish this are disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform
(SSR), which the author calls “gateway capacities”
since security, law, and order are prerequisites of sustainable development and overall stability. He then
explains how this was achieved in Liberia.
Finally, this monograph is written by a practitioner for practitioners. The author concludes with 28
concrete guidelines for practitioners seeking to implement DDR and SSR programs on the ground as well
as six recommendations for the U.S. Army on how to
improve its capabilities in this area.
			
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Recent events in Mali, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan,
Iraq, and elsewhere demonstrate that building professional indigenous forces is imperative to regional stability, yet few success stories exist. Liberia is a qualified “success,” and this case study explores how it was
achieved. It was written by one of the architects of the
program in Liberia, and is targeted specifically for the
practitioner. Liberia suffered a 14-year civil war replete with human rights atrocities that killed 250,000
people and displaced a third of its population. Following President Charles Taylor’s exile in 2003, the United States contracted DynCorp International to demobilize and rebuild the Armed Forces of Liberia and its
Ministry of Defence, the first time in 150 years that one
sovereign nation hired a private company to raise and
develop another sovereign nation’s military. This case
explores the theory and practice behind the successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR) of the legacy military and the security sector reform (SSR) that built the new one. Lastly, it considers
some of the benefits and difficulties of contracting out
the making of militaries. This is significant since the
private sector will probably participate increasingly
in security sector reform. The monograph concludes
with concrete recommendations that should inform
DDR and SSR planning and execution. It is written by
a practitioner for practitioners.

xi
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BUILDING BETTER ARMIES:
AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF LIBERIA
INTRODUCTION
In March 2012, a group of mutinying Malian soldiers staged a coup that overthrew that nation’s
constitutionally-elected government and attacked
the presidential palace, state television, and military
barracks. Soon after, mayhem followed. As the international community condemned the coup, the Taureg rebellion seized northern Mali and threatened to
advance south, fuelled by small arms from Libya and
al-Qaeda affiliates. Timbuktu and other towns in the
north fell to the advancing rebels, and a strict version
of Islamic law was imposed. Finally, the French intervened with military force and pushed the rebels out
of the area.
One disturbing story to this saga is the fact that
the United States had been training the Malian armed
forces for a number of years, including Captain Amadou Sanogo, who led the military coup. Reports indicate that Malian soldiers were overrun by rebels
and even defected to the enemy side. General Carter
F. Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), summed it up best: “[This is] very worrisome
for us.”1
Nor is this worry limited to Africa. In 2012, one
in seven of all North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) deaths in Afghanistan were at the hands of the
very Afghan troops the coalition was training.2 These
“green on blue” attacks describe an alarming series
of incidents where seemingly rogue Afghan security
forces turn their guns on their NATO counterparts. In
order to prevent further attacks, NATO responded in
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September 2012 by halting joint operations with Afghan security forces, following the deaths of six International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops over
1 weekend. A bleak Pentagon report found that only
one of the Afghan National Army’s 23 brigades was
able to operate independently without air or other
military support from the United States and NATO
partners.3 This does not augur well for the Afghan security forces’ ability to take over after the United States
withdraws in 2014, leaving a security vacuum in a
volatile region. U.S. efforts in Iraq have been similarly
frustrated as have United Nations’ (UN) experiences
in the Balkans, Haiti, Timor-Leste, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. This bodes poorly for potential
efforts in Syria and Libya.
Helping allies build better armies and police forces
is a strategic imperative. Operationally, building professional indigenous security forces is the exit strategy
for costly stability operations like Afghanistan because
it allows those countries to provide security for themselves rather than depend on the United States to do
so. Strategically, helping fragile states professionalize
their military and police promotes durable development, since corrupt security forces tend to devour the
fruits of development. Additionally, the United States
must help its partners develop effective security forces to contend with regional and transnational threats,
or it will face a Hobson’s choice: Send in U.S. troops
to do the job or permit minor threats to fester into
major ones.
Despite this strategic imperative, recent events in
Mali, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere demonstrate that few success stories exist. There are numerous reasons for this: It is hard to do; there is a theory
to practice gap on how to do it; there are no compre-
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hensive practitioner guides or field manuals; and few
practical models exist. The current “train and equip”
model is ineffective, as it focuses too much on tactics
and techniques and misses the important intangibles.
Or as General Ham reflected after Mali: “We didn’t
spend, probably, the requisite time focusing on values, ethics, and military ethos.”4
One alternate model and qualified success is Liberia. Ten years ago, it was one of the world’s worst
post-conflict zones, and now its military is deploying to Mali in the peacekeeping mission. This is a remarkable transformation, given the fact that Liberian
President Charles Taylor used much of the Liberian
military as an instrument of terror. In 2012, the UNbacked Special Court for Sierra Leone at The Hague
sentenced him to 50 years in prison for war crimes.
Today, the military is seen as a relative success, and
the program that built it is unique and unlike those
in Iraq and Afghanistan, making it a good case study.
This monograph explains how the Liberian armed
forces were transformed from a weapon of terror into
an instrument of security by one who helped design
and implement this sui generis program. Whether one
is raising an army of 2,000 or 200,000, the methods are
essentially the same, differing only in scale and scope.
The two tools needed to help a country acquire the
monopoly of legitimate force are disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). This monograph explores the theory
and practice behind these two programs, using the
case of Liberia where national forces were complicit in
atrocities and human rights abuses.
The United States must develop a solid capability to build better armies, or it will remain mired in
conflict affected countries like Afghanistan, face stra-
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tegic surprises in places like Mali, and be powerless to
prepare the future in countries like Libya and Syria.
Helping allies help themselves is a force multiplier
and a core pillar of U.S. national security strategy.
ESTABLISHING A STATE’S MONOPOLY
OF FORCE
A state requires the monopoly of force within its
territorial boundaries in order to uphold its rule of
law and promote stability. However, the challenges of
this are daunting in conflict affected countries because
armed groups are the de facto institutions of power,
and any attempt to alter them is deeply political. It
is also dangerous. Convincing a general or warlord
to put down his weapons and become a farmer may
not be welcomed and may even provoke violence. In
2002, the government of neighboring Côte d’Ivoire attempted to demobilize 750 soldiers, who, in response,
staged a coup leading to a civil war that lasted for
several years, despite a French and UN armed intervention to maintain peace. These programs are
extremely political, and technical approaches alone
court catastrophe.
Technically, the methods and processes for building effective indigenous security forces are the same
for both small and large countries; they are DDR and
SSR. DDR consolidates the state’s monopoly of force
by disbanding the competition, such as militias and insurgents, who threaten the country’s ability to impose
its governance. SSR professionalizes and strengthens
the state’s statutory armed actors so that they can responsibly enforce the law of the land and defend it
from armed threats.
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In theory, DDR and SSR work together in tandem
to help uphold the state’s rule of law and are also
gateway capacities, since security, law and order are
prerequisites of sustainable development and overall
stability. However, in practice, this is rarely done because DDR and SSR are difficult and dangerous. For
example, in Liberia the state forces themselves were
complicit in wide-scale atrocities and human rights
abuses. How exactly does one transform the military
from a symbol of terror into an instrument of democracy? How can one make a soldier someone a child
would run toward for safety rather than away from
in fear?
DDR: Disbanding the Competition.
The first step in establishing a state’s monopoly of
force is disbanding the competition. This means disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating combatants
safely into civil society and enabling them to earn livelihoods through peaceful means.5 DDR is the fulcrum
between war and peace. In the short term, those who
do not find peaceful ways to make a living are likely
to return to conflict or join gangs; in the long term,
disaffected ex-combatants can challenge public order
and polarize political debate, since they are often easy
targets of populist, reactionary, and extremist movements. To date, the UN is the leader in developing and
implementing DDR, with programs in Burundi, Côte
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, Nepal, the
Solomon Islands, and Haiti.6
As the term implies, DDR is a three-stage process.
The first stage involves disarming combatants, who
report to a safe and secure cantonment site within the
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conflict zone to turn in their small arms, munitions,
and light and heavy weapons. This is usually linked
to a broader small arms and light weapons counterproliferation program that documents and destroys
the weapons and munitions. The second stage demobilizes and disbands the armed nonstate groups, formally breaking up command structures and marking
their official entry into civilian life. Lastly, ex-combatants are reintegrated into civil society to prevent
another escalation of conflict. This typically is divided
into two parts: initial rehabilitation and long-term
reintegration. Initial rehabilitation entails giving excombatants short-term support packages and transporting them back to their homes to begin their new
lives. Long-term reintegration involves job training
and placement programs, working with communities
to accept ex-combatants and monitoring progress in
the difficult transition to civilian life. The overall goal
of DDR is to ensure permanent demobilization and
sustainable peace.
DDR is fraught with operational challenges that
can quickly backfire, possibly fomenting armed conflict. First, combatants often do not relinquish their
weapons if they do not believe the peacekeeping force
can ensure their safety. Owing to this, the peacekeeping force must be large enough to monopolize force
and to be perceived as credibly neutral by all parties,
which is tricky in a post-conflict country where distrust is ubiquitous. Second, armed groups generally
hold back their best fighters and weapons as a hedge
against others who renege on the peace agreement.
This creates a prisoner’s dilemma that encourages
preemptive defections from the peace process, as rebel groups fear that rivals will defect first and gain the
advantage of surprise in a renewed war.7 Mismanage-

6

ment of a DDR process—which is easy to do—creates
a classic race to the bottom.
Third, a combatant group typically disarms only
if all combatants disarm; otherwise, the disarmed
are vulnerable to the armed, who may seek reprisal
or gain against their defenseless enemies. Although
simple in theory, simultaneously disarming tens of
thousands of combatants in a highly chaotic and dangerous failed state with little logistical infrastructure
and much unresolved bad blood is thorny in practice.
Fourth, the victims of violence may not welcome DDR,
as they may question why the worst actors in the war
are rewarded with money and jobs, while the innocent get little or nothing—even if failing to transition
combatants to civilian life almost guarantees more
violence and victims.
Lastly, a DDR process requires a reliable funding
source. A program that runs out of money halfway
through can be worse than no program at all, since a
temporary or premature shutdown may provoke an
attack by the armed on the unarmed or encourage excombatants to take up the gun again to make a living.
Also, ex-combatants who are denied benefits might
seek reprisals against DDR staff. Unfortunately, it is
difficult to forecast DDR funding needs in conflicts
like that in Liberia, where nearly everyone is a perpetrator of violence, a victim, or both.
Owing to this, many DDR programs prioritize the
DD to get the guns and gangs off the streets but leave
the R to wither. The problem of the forgotten R—that
is, not fully reintegrating ex-combatants into society—
involves them turning rogue again, perpetuating the
cycle of violence as they earn a living or gain status
through violent crime. This manifests itself most visibly in criminal gangs, which often form from demo-

7

bilized groups and can terrorize the population, hinder peace efforts, and challenge the new police and
army’s legitimacy. Worse, unlike combatant groups,
gangs cannot undergo DDR because they are a law
enforcement problem and must be arrested, tried, and
incarcerated within the criminal justice system.8 In a
failed state, this adds a layer of complexity to an already complex situation.
In Liberia, the UN and United States shared DDR
responsibilities. The UN conducted the bulk of DDR
as it disarmed the entire country and demobilized and
reintegrated nonstate armed actors, such as Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and
the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), as
well as Liberian law enforcement. The United States
demobilized and reintegrated the Armed Forces of
Liberia (AFL). According to the UN, it disarmed and
demobilized 101,495 combatants and received 28,314
weapons and 6,486,136 rounds of small arms ammunition. Despite these numbers, the UN suffered setbacks, which is not surprising given the plethora of
problems associated with DDR in failed states. There
was a great deal of corruption and fraud regarding
qualification for DDR benefits, resulting in incredibly high numbers of ex-combatants; many observers
believe the number of actual combatants was closer
to 38,000.9
Detractors also argue that the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) began its program prematurely, in December 2003, before sufficient peacekeepers were on
the ground to guarantee security. Serious riots erupted
at the start of the program at Camp Schefflin, a DDR
site just outside of Monrovia, and the camp was shut
down. The riots were a planned attempt to disrupt
UN efforts and create instability, largely to increase
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monetary profits for warring factions, and would have
happened whenever the DDR program began.10 Four
months later, however, the program resumed without
incident and remains one of the most comprehensive
programs of its kind.
SSR: Acquiring the Monopoly of Force.
Working in tandem with DDR, SSR institutes the
monopoly of force within a territory and enables the
authority—government or otherwise—to enforce its
rule of law. Broadly speaking, the “security sector”
refers to those organizations and institutions that safeguard the state and its citizens from security threats.
SSR is the complex task of transforming the security
sector into a professional, effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable sector that supports the rule of
law. Like DDR, SSR is deeply political, and technical
approaches alone will fail. Program failure risks coup
d'etat, war, or worse.
To date, creating truly successful SSR programs
remains a major unmet challenge for the international
community, despite the growing prevalence of peacekeeping missions and nation building around the
world. There are several reasons for this. SSR is difficult to do. Also, there remains a significant theory
to practice gap.11 Consequently, there is no practicable
doctrine, best practice, or even common terminology.12 The concept itself has no commonly accepted
definition and has many names: security and justice
reform, security sector governance, security sector
development, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security system transformation.
As efforts to re-establish the security sectors in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere illustrate, few practical

9

models for SSR have been developed, perpetuating cycles of violence in fragile states and prolonging costly
peacekeeping missions.
While recognizing that many terms for SSR exist
and connote subtle differences to academics, the basic
purpose of the program remains the same to the practitioner: the reconstitution of a professional security
sector that upholds the rule of law. However, before
an explanation of what SSR is and how to do it, a few
caveats are necessary. First, security in this context
means “hard security”: physically protecting citizens
and the state from threats that endanger normal life,
public safety and survival. The development community has created a variety of “soft security” categories, such as food security and energy security. While
lack of food and energy may be contributing factors
to armed conflict, SSR should not attempt to rectify
food shortages or energy blackouts: That would be an
overreach of program scope. For an SSR program to
be manageable on the ground, it must be limited to the
security sector: those public organizations and government agencies with the primary mission of providing security such as the military and police. SSR seeks
to transform these organizations and institutions into
professional, effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable actors that support the rule of law.
A second caveat is that although SSR seeks to uphold the rule of law, it should not be confused with
justice sector reform (JSR). These two programs are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, but entail distinctly separate skill sets, tasks, and objectives. For example, an SSR program should not attempt to rewrite
a country’s constitution, address past human rights
abuses and crimes against humanity, or integrate indigenous systems of justice with international norms.
Nor should a JSR program attempt to recruit and train
10

military and police forces, determine weaponry and
organizational structure of security forces, or draft the
national security strategy. Despite this, theorists frequently merge JSR and SSR, which can lead to operational confusion on the ground for practitioners. Such
an all-encompassing program would likely result in
failure owing to a mismatch of ends, ways, and means
across programs.13
That said, an SSR program operating without a corresponding JSR program will likely be unsuccessful.
Without a functioning judiciary and appropriate laws
to enforce, police functionality and legitimacy suffer;
officers can end up being stooges of a corrupt legal
system. Similarly, a JSR program operating without
a commensurate SSR effort will probably fail because
criminal justice systems require professional police,
prisons, customs, and other instruments of law enforcement. SSR and JSR rise and fall together: Though
operationally distinct, they should be conceptually
integrated and closely coordinated.
A third caveat is that SSR is more than a “train
and equip” program, which, though necessary, only
creates better-dressed soldiers who shoot straighter.
SSR is more comprehensive than traditional train and
equip programs since SSR encompasses creating new
institutions, facilitating force structure14 decisions,
formulating national security strategy and doctrine,
recruiting and vetting new forces, constructing military bases and road infrastructure, selecting leadership, establishing oversight mechanisms within ministries and parliament, and many other complex tasks
that go well beyond simply training and equipping
troops. A train and equip campaign will not transform a security sector, and such programs alone will
invite failure.
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The security sector itself consists of three types
of actors: operational, institutional, and oversight.
Operational actors interact directly with the public on
security matters and may include law enforcement,
military and paramilitary forces, border control, customs, immigration, coast guard, and intelligence services. Institutional actors manage the policy, programs,
resources, and general administration of operational
actors and may include ministries of defense, interior,
and justice. Oversight bodies monitor and supervise
the security sector; they are ideally civilian led, democratically accountable to citizens, and able to ensure
that the security sector serves the people and not vice
versa. Oversight bodies may include the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government as
well as municipal and district authorities. One may
conceptualize the security sector as a pyramid of actors (see Figure 1). Not included in the security sector
are non-statutory security forces—that is, liberation
armies, armed criminal gangs, guerrilla forces, insurgents, and political party militias.
Executive, congress or
parliament

Oversight
Bodies

Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Justice

Institutions that
manage
operational actors
Operational actors in direct
contact with the population

Armed forces,
law enforcement,
border control,
immigration,
prisons, etc.

Figure 1. Taxonomy of the Security Sector.
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These three types of actors can, in turn, be grouped
into security sub-sectors, distinguished from one another by unique objectives, technical knowledge, capabilities, best practices, institutional culture, and
professional ethos. Sub-sectors can overlap and vary
widely among countries and regimes, but the idea is
useful to the practitioner designing and managing an
SSR program. Taken together, the hierarchy of actors
and security sub-sectors form a matrix of the security
sector (see Table 1).
Security
Sub-Sector

Operational
Actors

Institutional Actors

Oversight Actors
Executive,
Legislative,
Parliament

Military

Military, civil defense forces,
national guards, militias,
paramilitary

Ministry of
Defense

Law
Enforcement

Police, gendarmerie, prison,
criminal justice, presidential
guard

Ministry of
Interior, Ministry
of Justice

Border
Management

Border control,
immigration, coast guard,
customs authorities

Ministry of
Interior, Ministry
of Defense

Foreign
Relations

Embassies, attachés, and
security liaison officers

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of
Defense

Intelligence

Collection assets

Intelligence
agencies

Table 1. Analytical Framework
of the Security Sector.15
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Executive,
Legislative,
Parliament,
Judiciary,
Municipal and
District
Governments
and Councils

Executive,
Legislative,
Parliament

This analytical framework will assist the planner
categorize and understand the myriad elements of
the security sector in any given country or governed
area. This will also help the planner to task organize
a tailored response for the SSR program. For example,
if the U.S. Government is facilitating the program,
it makes sense that the U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) would manage the military sub-sector among
the operational and perhaps the institutional actors.
Another organization like the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) might work with the host nation’s parliament to establish viable oversight mechanisms. As
the matrix suggests, building sub-sector capacity and
professionalizing actors makes SSR a fundamentally
“whole of government” and comprehensive effort,
making it complicated to execute.
There are several challenges to implementing SSR
programs. First, though there is a growing consensus
that early local ownership of SSR work is a critical
component of its sustainability; translating this principle into concrete reality remains a challenge.16 Even
the definition of local ownership is contested. Deciding which local leaders and political groups truly represent local aspirations may be difficult, fraught with
uncertainty, and have political ramifications in both
indigenous and international politics. Also, local actors
often have competing visions and priorities; choosing local partners can be perilous in conflict-affected
countries where there is often imperfect knowledge of
parochial agendas. In addition, it may prove difficult
to keep insurgents and spoilers out of the process. If
they are deemed key stakeholders, they gain legitimacy and the ability to obstruct progress from within.
Finally, measuring ownership is difficult. What metrics are appropriate? Should they privilege local or
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international values and priorities? Local ownership
is sound in theory but ambiguous in practice.
Second, as the security sector is comprised of various agencies and departments, successful SSR conceptually demands a whole of government response from
donor nations. There are several reasons why this is
seldom, if ever, done in practice. SSR is a relatively
new idea, emerging after the Cold War, and consequently suffers from a dearth of coherent frameworks,
common definitions, and technical expertise. On the
practical level, SSR strategy demands cooperation
from a wide range of agencies that often have conflicting perspectives, priorities, and objectives. The result
is often competition between agencies and the uncoordinated and ad hoc implementation of SSR programs.
Additionally, the lengthy time horizon for SSR to
produce noticeable change may cause donors to lose
interest or focus.
Third, SSR is a political process that must be accomplished in partnership with the country undergoing the reform. Conflict-affected countries’ security
forces, both statutory and nonstatutory, are the de
facto institutions of power when the process begins,
and altering them can provoke violent reactions and a
relapse into armed conflict. It is difficult to persuade
a general or warlord in Afghanistan or Liberia to put
down the rifle and become a wheat farmer. International organizations or bilateral partners who ignore
the political nuances of SSR and attempt to implement
it in a purely unilateral and technical manner will fail.
Fourth, SSR is difficult to operationalize. The majority of countries undergoing SSR are fragile or failed
states emerging from armed conflicts. Operating in
wrecked countries with ruined infrastructure and in
areas where everything seems to be a priority is chal-
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lenging. SSR processes are resource intensive, requiring significant numbers of trainers and staff, a large
logistical footprint, and a programmatic robustness
capable of training, equipping, fielding, and sustaining the new security force. It takes years and even
decades to create a viable security sector.
Fifth, SSR programs have few good metrics for
success. Even the definition of security is ambiguous.
Does it refer to state security, regional security, or
human security? If all three, how should they be prioritized and integrated? Many of the principles that
inform different ideas about security may not easily
translate into a coherent and actionable national security strategy. The human security perspective holds
that a country is secure when individuals attain “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” How exactly should the armed forces and other instruments
of national power provide this? 17
Finally, international donors are quick to resort to
traditional train-and-equip programs in an effort to
improve the operational effectiveness of local security
forces and put new police on the streets and soldiers
in the field. Such programs quickly produce visible
results and clear statistics, including the number of
trainees, uniformed personnel on duty, and operational vehicles. They do little, however, to transform
institutions, establish government oversight, and create an appropriate civil-military relationship, which
are the goals of SSR.
Despite the challenges, SSR processes are an invaluable support for countries looking to move beyond conflict. They help the state consolidate the
monopoly of force it needs to uphold the rule of law
by assessing the current security sector in terms of
capacity, efficiency, and relevance, and by support-

16

ing the creation of a balanced and effective security
sector, informed by a clear understanding of its objectives, threats, and resources available. SSR work can
reconstitute and professionalize security forces, such
as the military and police; build civilian-led securitysector institutions, such as the ministries of interior,
defense, and justice, which can manage security organs competently; and establish transparent oversight
mechanisms for the security sector in the executive
and legislative branches, providing capable security
sector governance and making the security sector accountable to citizens through democracy. Finally, SSR
processes can assist in developing a national security
strategy that addresses the root causes of armed conflict and geopolitical threats as appropriate for that
country, and translate national strategies down to
local levels.
However, SSR work must itself be part of a larger
peacemaking effort. It cannot resolve ongoing armed
conflicts or substitute for peace enforcement activities when those are required. Nor can it address past
abuse and injustices or transform the justice sector;
that is, managing transitional justice, writing laws, or
redressing past security-sector crimes. Finally, it cannot transition combatants to civilian life—which is the
province of DDR.
DDR and SSR Linkages.
DDR and SSR should be naturally linked programs
since they rise or fall together. DDR, encompassing
the processes that safely transition combatants back
to civilian life, and SSR, involving the reconstitution
and professionalization of security institutions and
actors, are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.
Working in tandem, they can enable countries emerg17

ing from conflict to provide for their own security and
uphold the rule of law, an essential precondition of
sustainable development and part of the exit strategy
for costly peacekeeping missions. As such, politically,
they rise or fall together. Without a monopoly on the
use of force, a state has few ways to uphold the rule
of law and protect citizens from threats.18 By definition, conflict-affected states have lost this monopoly,
and the joint purpose of DDR and SSR programs is to
restore or establish it by disbanding nonstate armed
actors and reconstituting statutory forces.
Beyond their shared political objectives, DDR and
SSR are programmatically linked, as failure of one
risks failure of the other. Ex-combatants who are not
properly reintegrated into civil society through DDR
can complicate and potentially compromise SSR. Excombatants who do not successfully transition to civilian life may take up arms again or form criminal
gangs, challenging newly created security institutions
and forces that may lack sufficient capacity to control
such threats. As the population thus becomes vulnerable to violence, the state’s inability to protect its citizens undermines its legitimacy.
Inversely, if DDR succeeds but SSR falters, then
people begin to rely on nonstate actors—ethnicity- or
religion-based militias or village self-defense forces—
for their security. In some parts of Afghanistan where
the reach of national law enforcement is limited, Afghans have turned to tribal authorities or the Taliban
to provide security and justice. Worse, such states can
offer safe havens for armed opposition groups, insurgents, organized crime, and other armed nonstate actors that foment conflict and regional destabilization.
Providing security is an essential component of governance, and states that cannot provide it are seen as
inept and illegitimate.
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DDR and SSR are also operationally linked, as
many ex-combatants seek employment in the new security forces that SSR programs create. This transference from DDR to SSR occurs during the reintegration
phase of DDR, making it the natural point of intersection between the two. That is, after being disarmed
and demobilized, many ex-combatants may seek job
training and reintegration in the new security sector
as soldiers or policemen. They then fall under the
SSR program, which vets them for past human rights
abuses and assesses their qualifications for duty. No
ex-combatant should ever be guaranteed a job in
the new security sector without undergoing proper
selection processes.
Combining DDR and SSR, if done properly, reenforces the peace settlement by fortifying mutual trust
among former enemies and encouraging followers
to lay down their guns and enter civilian life. This is
particularly true if ex-combatants perceive that they
will have a substantive role in crafting and serving
in the new government. If not done properly, many
will seek employment in militias, organized crime, or
private security companies, allowing them to legally
carry weapons. This can result in reconstituted warring parties under new names—some of which will be
licensed to employ lethal force.
Lastly, DDR and SSR jointly promote development,
as economic growth depends on long-term security
and stability, which DDR and SSR both provide when
implemented correctly. This peace dividend manifests
itself in preserving resources and infrastructure, freeing and managing labor, and furthering reconciliation
that encourages investment and entrepreneurship.
DDR and SSR processes also promote the interests of
women, minorities, and child soldiers, who should
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be supported in a consistent manner within the two
programs. A growing body of literature illuminates
the strengths of considering gender in DDR and SSR,
particularly if the programs are managed together so
women can benefit from and contribute to both.19
Despite the fundamental linkages between DDR
and SSR programs, they are often planned and executed disjointedly in the field, causing problems. It
has been argued, in both the academic literature and
manuals for practitioners, that DDR and SSR are separate and distinct processes involving different actors,
priorities, timelines, and functions. The majority of
scholarship on the topic deals with either DDR or SSR
but rarely treats both in an integrated manner, resulting in disjointed approaches and mismatched conceptual frameworks on reestablishing the state’s monopoly of force.20 Practioner’s guides for field use tend to
specialize in either one or the other but not both. For
example, the UN, a leader in conducting DDR, issues
DDR standards in relative isolation from SSR concerns. Similarly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance
Committee (OECD-DAC) issues a Handbook on Security System Reform that does not substantially address
DDR.21 Both academia and practice generally assume
DDR and SSR are separate and isolated programs,
and that DDR is a relatively quick process followed
sequentially by SSR, which plays out over time.
Operationally, there are serious challenges to integrating them. There are several reasons for this. First,
DDR and SSR programs are political, and changing
power structures in a conflict-affected country is complex and dangerous. Reintegrating ex-combatants
who may still harbor legitimate grievances against the
government, or transforming security institutions into
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those that will lawfully use force, is understandably
difficult and can easily provoke a relapse into armed
conflict. The political concerns, priorities, and agendas
of ex-combatants in DDR versus SSR processes may
differ, making it challenging for program planners to
adopt a unified approach to political issues.
Different levels of local support and ownership
may exist for DDR versus SSR. A population traumatized by civil war may welcome the disarming
of combatants, but may shun their inclusion in new
security forces, especially if distrust of the police and
military linger because of atrocities committed in the
past. Conversely, local populations may not welcome
ex-combatants into their communities, but strongly
desire a new, professional police force. These different
levels of local support can decouple DDR and SSR.
Programmatically, DDR and SSR can be difficult to
synchronize, owing to their differing priorities, objectives, and time horizons. DDR is complicated in that
it is difficult, yet it has clear and achievable objectives,
and a solution can be engineered. SSR, meanwhile, is
complex in that there are no clear and achievable objectives that can reliably be measured, and a solution
may not be obvious at first. Also, SSR programs take
years and even decades to complete, while DDR generally takes months.
Such a separation of functions, however, has deleterious effects on the ability of conflict-affected countries to recover and establish a viable security sector.
Owing to their natural linkages, and in partnership
with the host nation, DDR and SSR should be planned,
resourced, implemented, and evaluated as a single entity. This involves several challenges, however, both
in SSR and DDR as components, and in combining
them as part of a larger process.
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Therefore, embedding DDR within SSR and fully
integrating the two programs is the best way to deal
with these challenges, and as mentioned previously,
the two processes even have a natural point of intersection: the reintegration phase of DDR programs, which
can flow into longer-term SSR work as ex-combatants
find legal and peaceful employment in the new security apparatus that SSR programs create. Problematically, however, reintegration is also often the most
difficult aspect of DDR, owing to the aforementioned
issue of the forgotten R. This makes reintegration both
the best place to incorporate DDR into SSR and one
of the clear sites where such an incorporation can fail.
THE CASE OF LIBERIA
Monrovia is the capital of Liberia, a small West
African country that, by the summer of 2003, had suffered 14 years of civil war epitomized by torture, rape,
child soldiers, blood diamonds, and fratricide. The city
is situated on the Atlantic Ocean and inhabits a peninsula parallel to the mainland with only three entrances: one road and two bridges. On July 18, 2003, the city
was sealed off by rebels—from the east by LURD and
from the south by MODEL. Ferociously defending the
gateways to Monrovia were remnants of the AFL still
loyal to President Taylor, a notorious warlord accused
of war crimes and crimes against humanity.22 At the
time, Liberia was more of a kingdom than a state. As
one Liberian put it, “Ghankay [Charles Taylor] is our
law. He understands that the man with the gun is a
strongman.”23
Taylor has been accused of murdering and mutilating civilians during his reign from 1989 to 2003, illegally trafficking in diamonds and timber to enrich
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himself at the expense of the state, abducting women
and girls as sex slaves, and forcing children and adults
into pressed labor and fighting during the war in Sierra
Leone.24 His militias chased down civilians and asked
them if they wanted a long-sleeved or a short-sleeved
shirt. For people who said long sleeves, the fighters
hacked off their hands at the wrist with a machete.
People who said short sleeves had their arms hacked
off closer to the shoulder. To this day, people missing one, two, and even four limbs lie on the streets of
Monrovia begging for money.25 Taylor also supported
rebel groups in the adjacent countries of Guinea and
Côte d’Ivoire to agitate ongoing conflicts there and
destabilize his neighbors. In July 2003, those same
countries returned the favor, helping unseat Taylor by
aiding LURD and MODEL. In late 2002, The Economist
predicted that Liberia would be “the world’s worst
place to live” that year.26 They were right.
The fighting was fierce, and all sides committed
atrocities. Child soldiers were commonplace, the line
between combatants and civilians blurred, and the
laws of war were utterly ignored. The battles over the
bridges into Monrovia were so intense that the road
was paved in blood and brass shells; lampposts, road
signs, and nearby buildings were riddled with bullet holes. As John W. Blaney, the U.S. ambassador to
Liberia, later recalled in an interview: “It was really
like a 14th-century siege. The two rebel armies had
surrounded Monrovia with the government’s troops
inside of Monrovia and the two rebel armies pressing
hard outside.”27 Frustrated by AFL resistance, rebels
started indiscriminately shelling the overcrowded
inner city with mortars, killing more than 1,000 civilians.28 Liberians described the situation as “World
War III” and began piling their dead at the gates of
the U.S. Embassy in a macabre plea for help.29
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Monrovia was already a humanitarian disaster,
as hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Liberians had fled the fighting in the hinterlands for
the capital, which could not accommodate them all.
With no electricity, water, sewage, police, food, or any
other accoutrement of modern life, the city became a
massive slum of tin shacks, garbage, human waste,
disease, and lawlessness. Liberia was once the jewel
of West Africa and a popular international vacation
destination: Pam Am airlines had flown directly from
New York City to Monrovia three times a week.30 Now
the country was apocalyptic.
International pressure mounted as the siege went
on, stretching from days into weeks. U.S. President
George W. Bush twice demanded on international
television that Taylor “leave Liberia” and stationed
2,300 marines in three U.S. Navy ships off the country’s shore.31 Nigeria offered Taylor asylum if he left,
shielding him from the machinations of international
law.32 The UN Security Council authorized a multinational peacekeeping force in Liberia, citing its deep
concern over “the humanitarian situation, including
the tragic loss of countless innocent lives . . . and its
destabilising effect on the region.”33 Meanwhile, the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional international organization, hastily
assembled a force to relieve the city.
With global pressure intensifying and rebels at the
gates, Taylor finally yielded on August 11 and fled
to Nigeria. He blamed Liberia’s problems on foreign
meddling and cast himself the martyr: “Because Jesus
died, we are saved today. I want to be the sacrificial
lamb. I am the whipping boy. It’s easy to say ‘It’s because of Taylor’. After today, there will be no more
Taylor to blame.”34 A few days later, the rebels lifted
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their siege, and 1,000 ECOWAS peacekeepers and 200
U.S. Marines entered the city to provide emergency
humanitarian assistance and prevent a relapse of violence. “God bless you, Oga,” women cried to convoys
of Nigerians, using the Nigerian Yoruba word for
“boss.” “God bless you, Marine,” they sang to other
vehicles filled with American troops.35 On August 18,
the two rebel groups and what was left of Taylor’s
government signed a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) at Accra, Ghana, ending Liberia’s bloody
civil war.36
However, a tragic legacy remained: After 150
years of troubled history, 14 years of civil war, and
horrific abuses of power, Liberia was shattered. Its infrastructure was beyond destroyed, any semblance of
civil governance had been long since abandoned, and
much of its population was either displaced or dead.
To this day, Liberia is plagued by intense hunger and
poverty, no central running water or sewage, no telephone landlines, and no electrical grid. Small generators power most of the country.
The human cost was even greater. As a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) report describes, in a country of only three million:
over 250,000 people, most of them civilian non-combatants, have lost their lives in the civil war. More than
1.3 million have been displaced, including hundreds
of thousands who fled the country. Abductions, torture, rape and other human rights abuses have taken
place on a massive scale. It is estimated that at least
one in ten children may have been recruited into militias at one time or another. A similar percentage has
been traumatised by seeing their families and friends
murdered and raped.37
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Almost everyone in Liberia was affected by the
war. Post-conflict polls show that 96 percent of respondents had some direct experience of the conflict,
and, of these, an astonishing 90 percent were at one
point or another displaced from their homes.38
Liberia is a stark example of post-conflict state
disintegration; as Africa expert Peter Pham observes,
“Tragically, the recent history of Liberia has been a
case study par excellence of a failed state.”39 Beginning
with the first coup d’etat in 1980, national authority—
if it even existed—rarely extended beyond Monrovia.
Institutions were anemic, and those who possessed
the means of violence served warlords such as Taylor
rather than the state. Civilians were both the principal
actors and targets of armed conflict, displacing nearly
half the population and destabilizing the region.
By 2003, there were no functioning public utilities, and most Liberians still have no access to electricity, water, sanitation facilities, or health care. Basic
infrastructure such as roads and bridges—which aid
workers, entrepreneurs, peacekeepers, and Liberians
themselves all need, especially in rural areas—are in
dire need of repairs. A whole generation of Liberians
received no formal education, and the country suffered a brain drain of those that did. Liberia has no
functioning judicial system, leaving it with a culture
of impunity: Most courts have been destroyed, and
trial by ordeal is not unheard of outside the capital.
Historical Roots of the Conflict.
Like Ethiopia, Liberia never knew colonialization. Freed African-American slaves and abolitionists
founded it in 1822 with the help of the United States
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as an outpost for other freed slaves returning from
the Americas. The country’s name is derived from the
Latin word liber, meaning free, and its capital Monrovia was named in honor of U.S. President James Monroe, who held office at the country’s founding and
supported its creation. Liberia’s red, white, and blue
flag is modeled on the U.S. flag, and its currency is the
Liberian dollar. The country was an eager and willing
U.S. ally during World War II and the Cold War.
Growing from an outpost to a commonwealth, Liberia achieved statehood in 1847 with the ratification
of a constitution drafted at Harvard University. However, problems loomed. Few of the freed slaves who
found new beginnings in Liberia were from that region of Africa, and they proceeded to treat local tribes
in ways comparable to their own treatment in the
Americas. Soon a rift developed between descendants
of the freed slaves, known as Americo-Liberians, and
the 14 or so indigenous tribes. This evolved into a hierarchical caste system with four distinct classes. At
the top were the elites: Americo-Liberian officials of
mixed black and white ancestry with light skin (also
known as mulattos). Second were darker-skinned
Americo-Liberians, consisting mostly of laborers and
small farmers. Third were the “recaptives” or “Congos,” African captives on U.S.-bound slave ships who
were rescued by the U.S. Navy and brought to Liberia.
At the bottom of the hierarchy were the indigenous Liberians.40 The first three classes—comprising less than
3 percent of the population—retained absolute political control, enjoyed a monopoly of social privilege,
and benefitted substantially from the unequal distribution of power and wealth within the country. This
tyranny of the elites went unabated until 1980, when a
coup d‘etat irrevocably altered the national landscape.
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End of Americo-Liberian Rule.
The 1970s marked the beginning of the end for the
elites’ 125-year rule. In 1971, William Tubman, Liberia’s president for 27 years, died while in office. His
Open Door economic policy had proven a boon for Liberia, giving it the largest mercantile fleet and rubber
industry in the world. The country also became the
third-largest exporter of iron ore globally and received
over $1 billion in foreign investment. Few, however,
enjoyed the benefits, as the prospering Americo-Liberians tended not to share the wealth. This further
widened the rift between the elites and the rest of the
population, setting the conditions for revolt.
Tubman’s vice president and successor, William
Tolbert, attempted to ward off the crash course the
country was on, but his own Americo-Liberian roots
combined with the ensconced system of political and
social elitism hindered his efforts. Adversaries almost
immediately accused him of nepotism and cronyism.
However, he also began to liberalize Liberia by introducing reforms to allow more indigenous Liberians
in government and creating the first opposition party
in the nation’s history, the Progressive Alliance of Liberia, to run against the Americo-Liberians’ old True
Whig Party. Though re-elected in 1975, his government was criticized sharply for failing to address the
deep economic disparities between the Americo-Liberians and the rest of the population. Social unrest began to swell as the majority felt change was occurring
too slowly, while power-wielding Americo-Liberians
felt it was too rapid.
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Tensions came to a head in 1979. In April, Tolbert’s administration proposed to raise the price of
government-subsidized rice by 50 percent, claiming
it would promote more local farming, slow the rate
of urban migration, and reduce dependence on imported rice. Opposition leaders claimed the measure
was meant only to benefit the Tolbert family, which
controlled the rice monopoly in Liberia. Hundreds
of people marched through Monrovia, protesting the
sharp rise in the price of rice. Tolbert ordered troops
to fire on the demonstrators, killing some 70 people.
So-called rice riots soon spread throughout Liberia,
and government attempts to quash them by arresting
the opposition leaders failed. Tolbert’s credibility was
dealt a mortal blow, and the situation within Liberia
continued to decay.
On April 12, 1980, AFL Master Sergeant Samuel
Doe, an ethnic Krahn, led a coup d‘etat, ending the
133-year monopoly of power that the AmericoLiberians’ True Whig Party had enjoyed. The coup
gained immediate popular acceptance, and Doe adopted the revolutionary slogan that “in the cause of
the people, the struggle continues.” Doe personally
disemboweled Tolbert in his bed and then ordered
the public execution of 13 top-ranking ministers and
members of the Tolbert family. They were tied to
poles on South Beach in Monrovia and shot to death.
Many ranking government ministers who survived
were tried, tortured, and paraded naked through
downtown Monrovia. African countries, allies, and
trading partners widely condemned the coup; a flight
of capital and the elites soon ensued, including future
president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.
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The Reign of Samuel Doe: 1980–89.
Following the coup, Doe suspended the constitution and established the People’s Redemption Council
(PRC) with full powers, consisting of 17 enlisted men
headed by Doe. The PRC imposed a price freeze on all
commodities, including imported foods, and doubled
the salaries of civil servants and military personnel.
Doe lacked formal education, and, by many accounts,
he was illiterate when he assumed the presidency. After only 1 year, he executed five PRC members, including his vice head of state and coup comrade Thomas
Weh-Syen, claiming they had plotted against him. As
he grew increasingly paranoid regarding threats to
his leadership, he placed members of his own Krahn
ethnic group in key positions. Soon the Krahn dominated the government, and as Africa expert Peter
Pham notes, “The new regime turned increasingly
brutal and proved even less popular than its predecessors.”41 Doe’s inner circle became as disillusioned
with the autocratic regime as was the general population. In November 1983, three prominent members of
the PRC left Liberia: Thomas Quiwonkpa, who was
the AFL’s commanding general; Prince Yormie Johnson, Quiwonkpa’s aide; and Charles Taylor, the head
of the General Service Agency. All would eventually
challenge Doe.
Doe further solidified control by holding elections
in 1985, which were characterized by widespread
fraud. Before the election, more than 50 of Doe’s opponents were murdered, and most of the elected opposition candidates refused to take their seats. Liberia’s
political situation continued to erode with increased
human rights abuses, corruption, and ethnic tensions.
On November 12, 1985, Quiwonkpa staged a coup
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with an estimated 500 to 600 people from neighboring
Sierra Leone; the AFL killed them all, and Quiwonkpa’s body was dragged through Monrovia’s streets.
The Krahn-dominated AFL then retaliated against the
ethnic groups in Quiwonkpa’s native Nimba County,
causing widespread loss of life within the Gio and
Mano communities.
Despite Doe’s poor human rights record and dubious democratic credentials, his regime enjoyed considerable U.S. financial and political support. Washington considered Monrovia an important strategic
ally during the Cold War, and from 1981 to 1985, the
United States gave Liberia $402 million in aid, more
than Liberia had ever received before and more financial aid per capita than any other sub-Saharan country
received during the 1980s.42 Doe even met with President Ronald Reagan twice, and some have speculated
that the U.S. endorsement of the 1985 election results—despite international and domestic observers’
reports that it was compromised—may have led Doe
to declare an unchallenged victory over his closest
rival, Jackson F. Doe, whom many believed, and still
maintain, was the true winner.43
The Reign of Charles Taylor: 1989–2003.
On Christmas Eve of 1989, Charles Taylor and approximately 100 fighters, some trained in Libya, invaded Liberia from neighboring Côte d’Ivoire. Named the
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), this rebel
incursion initially enjoyed popular support within
Nimba County, which had endured the majority of
Samuel Doe’s wrath after the 1985 attempted coup.
Within 6 months, Taylor’s forces reached the outskirts
of Monrovia, but were stopped by AFL counterattacks.
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A bloody civil war ensued, claiming hundreds of
thousands of lives and displacing a million people
in a country of only four million. The human toll of
the 14-year war (1989–2003) is estimated at 270,000
dead, 320,000 long-term internally displaced people,
and 75,000 refugees in neighboring countries. Almost
everybody in Liberia was touched by the war: A recent poll shows that 96 percent of respondents had
some direct experience of the conflict, and of these, a
shocking 90 percent were at one point or another displaced from their homes.44 The situation was so dire
that ECOWAS, a regional international organization,
intervened in 1990 under the premise of a cease-fire
and peace deal, albeit without the NPFL. ECOWAS’s
peacekeeping force, the Economic Community of
West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG),
prevented the NPFL from entering Monrovia. However, the NPFL ravaged the Krahn and Mandingo
areas of Liberia, with widespread atrocities reported.
Although reports vary, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was apparently affiliated with Charles Taylor’s movement.45
In July 1990, the NPFL splintered. Prince Johnson
formed the Independent National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (INPFL), which captured and killed Doe on
September 9, 1990, torturing him on Monrovia’s beach.
AFL soldiers fled to Sierra Leone and founded the new
insurgent United Liberation Movement of Liberia for
Democracy (ULIMO). Soon after, an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), with Amos C. Sawyer
as its president, was formed in Gambia with ECOWAS support. However, Taylor did not recognize the
IGNU, and the fighting continued. By 1995, Liberia’s
civil war had grown to involve seven major factions,
including the AFL, which acted as an armed political
organ rather than a professional military. These seven
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factions joined to form the Liberian Council of State,
in accordance with the 1995 Abuja Peace Accords.
However, fighting still continued, and 1996 saw some
of the war’s deadliest battles.
Taylor finally agreed to a peace deal after more
than a dozen peace accords and the exhaustion of his
military power. A five-man transitional government
was established, and warring factions were hastily
disarmed and demobilized in advance of special elections, held on July 19, 1997. Taylor and his National
Patriotic Party emerged victorious. Taylor himself
won the election by a large majority, gaining 75 percent of the vote primarily because Liberians feared a
return to war if Taylor lost. However, peace in Liberia
did not last long. Taylor’s government did nothing to
improve the lives of Liberians: Unemployment and illiteracy stood above 75 percent, little investment was
made in the country’s infrastructure, reconciliation
between factions was largely ignored, and rule of law
was eclipsed by a patronage system that recognized
Taylor as its supreme authority.
Taylor’s actions not only exacerbated Liberia’s
intractable civil war; they helped foment civil war in
Sierra Leone. Taylor backed the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF), a Sierra Leonean rebel group, and reportedly directed RUF operations from Liberia. He is
accused of selling them weapons in exchange for diamonds, which they typically extracted with slave labor
and under threat of maiming or death; hence the term
“blood diamonds.” Owing to the UN embargo against
arms sales to Liberia at the time, the weapons were
purchased largely on the black market through arms
smugglers such as Viktor Bout.46 Taylor is also charged
with aiding and abetting RUF atrocities against civilians and assisting in the recruitment of child soldiers.
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Like Liberia’s war, Sierra Leone’s civil war was total.
More than 200,000 of the country’s 2.6 million people
were killed. Approximately 800,000 were internally
displaced, and another 700,000 sought refuge in
neighboring countries. The fighting destroyed much
of the country’s infrastructure, including water and
electricity. Sierra Leone’s war also left it a ward of the
international community under the protection of the
UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which had
a Chapter VII mandate. The UN declared UNAMSIL’s
mission complete in 2005, although the country remains precariously fragile.
Taylor’s misrule at home led to the resumption of
armed rebellion among his former adversaries. LURD
was formed in 1999 and engaged in sporadic fighting
with the AFL in northern Lofa County, which borders
Guinea. It was headed by Sekou Conneh, a businessman married to the daughter of Guinean president
Lansana Conté. By 2000, it was believed that LURD
controlled nearly 80 percent of the countryside.
Throughout the fighting, both the AFL and LURD
were accused of widespread human rights violations
as well as child soldier recruitment. In 2003, MODEL
formed as an offshoot of LURD in Côte d’Ivoire and
enjoyed support in the southeastern counties of Grand
Gedeh, Sinoe, and Grand Kru. By the spring of 2003,
LURD and MODEL had advanced to the outskirts
of Monrovia, and intense fighting took place in and
around the city. Thus began the siege of Monrovia.
With fighting escalating, Taylor agreed to participate in an ECOWAS-sponsored peace summit in Ghana between the government of Liberia, civil society,
and the LURD and MODEL rebel groups. In the hope
that Taylor’s Ghanaian hosts would arrest him, the
chief prosecutor of the UN-supported Special Court
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for Sierra Leone issued a press statement announcing
the opening of a sealed March 7, 2003, indictment of
Taylor for “bearing the greatest responsibility” for
atrocities in Sierra Leone since November 1996.47 Reportedly caught by surprise and unwilling to arrest
Taylor, Ghana refused to detain him. Within hours,
Taylor returned to Monrovia, where the fighting continued and intensified, creating a massive humanitarian disaster. Rebels indiscriminately fired mortars into
downtown Monrovia, and the bodies of the innocent
began to pile up.
U.S. Ambassador Blaney requested military assistance, and in response, the United States established
Joint Task Force Liberia, comprised of three Navy
ships and 2,300 troops of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. This force positioned itself off the West
African coast and sent a small number of Marines to
protect the embassy, which had come under attack.
At this point, the rebels were on the mainland trying
to cross the bridges to inner-city Monrovia, which
was heavily defended by Taylor’s forces. During one
of these firefights, Blaney walked onto the middle
of a bridge and demanded both sides stop fighting.
Amazingly, they did.48
Finally, on August 11, 2003, under intense international pressure, Taylor accepted an ECOWAS-brokered peace deal that offered him asylum in Nigeria.
LURD, MODEL, and the Government of Liberia signed
a comprehensive peace agreement in Accra, Ghana,
on August 18, 2003, known as the Accra Accords. This
paved the way for the deployment of what became a
3,600-strong ECOWAS peacekeeping mission in Liberia—ECOMIL—and also established a 2-year National
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), headed
by Liberian businessman Gyude Bryant.
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The UN Takes Charge.
The UN took over security duties in October 2003,
subsuming ECOMIL into UNMIL, which had an authorized strength of 15,000 UN blue-helmet military
personnel and 1,115 police officers, making it the
world’s largest UN peacekeeping mission at the time.
UNMIL’s mission as established by Security Council
Resolution 1509 and led by Jacques Paul Klein was
to monitor the ceasefire agreement, but it rapidly
evolved into a rebuilding of the country. In terms of
priorities, everything was urgent in Liberia: security,
humanitarian relief, good governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. The
NTGL nominally led Liberia as the UN prepared the
country for elections in 2005, though many regarded
the NTGL as a kleptocracy.49
The 2005 elections are considered the most free,
fair, and peaceful elections in Liberia’s history. The
October 11, 2005, presidential and legislative elections,
and the subsequent November 8, 2005, presidential
run-off saw the victory of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, former World Bank official and human rights advocate,
over George Weah, an international football star and
former UN Children’s Fund goodwill ambassador. Inaugurated in January 2006, President Johnson-Sirleaf,
nicknamed the Iron Lady, is Africa’s first democratically elected female president. Her government of
technocrats draws from Liberia’s many ethnic groups
and also includes members of the Liberian diaspora—that is, those who had fled the country earlier. In
March 2006, her reversal of an earlier position led to
Charles Taylor being turned over to the Special Court
for Sierra Leone.
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The country has remained remarkably stable since
the 2005 elections and may even serve as a model of
post-conflict stability in a neo-medieval world. As
Blaney and Klein observed in 2010:
The country’s future may not yet be secure, and much
progress has yet to be made, but most of those present
in the immediate aftermath of the war in 2003 would
agree that today’s Liberia is a comparative miracle.50

Johnson-Sirleaf has pursued an ambitious reconstruction agenda aimed at political stability and economic recovery, emphasizing job creation, education,
attracting investment, and infrastructure repair, as
well as restoration of public services, security sector
reform, and a “government of inclusion.” She has bolstered public trust by taking a strong stand against
corruption, which is endemic in Liberia’s political system. She has dismissed several government officials,
including much of the Ministry of Finance, and supported experienced and technically competent senior
officials. Her World Bank background has allowed her
to forge strong relations with the international community and donor nations, which is crucial given Liberia’s dependence on foreign aid.
Yet political conditions in Liberia are still perilous,
as the roots of conflict have not been fully addressed,
institutions are weak, development is still taking hold,
the region of West Africa is unstable, and violence as a
political solution is a precedent that cannot be ignored.
To date, the UN ultimately guarantees Liberia’s security, and grave concerns remain about the country’s
future once it departs. The country’s prospects remain
uncertain given the government’s limited capacity, the
dangerous geopolitical neighborhood it inhabits, and
the many spoilers waiting in the wings. To survive as
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a state, a government needs a monopoly of force to
uphold its rule of law and fend off armed threats to
its existence.
SSR success is helped if it is required in formal
peace treaties, giving it a clear mandate. In Liberia, the
Accra Accords settled the civil war, and Part 4 specifically mandated SSR.51 In sharing responsibilities for
the process, UNMIL assumed the restructuring of civilian elements of the security sector, and the United
States the transformation of the military sub-sector,
owing to its historical ties to Liberia and especially its
defense. The U.S. Navy guaranteed security during
the 19th century; the United States oversaw the creation of the Liberian Frontier Force in 1908, used Liberia as a strategic logistical supply node for the North
Africa campaign of World War II, and gave substantial military aid to Liberia during the Cold War. Also,
as an internal Department of State (DoS) document
explained, the “International community expects the
US to take the lead in this endeavor. No other country will do so.”52 This monograph focuses on the U.S.
program to transform the defense sector and does not
address the UN’s beleaguered efforts at reforming
the Liberian National Police, which remains a critical
problem today.
Outsourcing DDR and SSR.
The crucial task of rebuilding Liberia’s military was
outsourced to DynCorp International, which worked
in parallel with the UN but not under it. DynCorp is
a private military company (PMC), sometimes also
called a private security company. PMCs are conflict
entrepreneurs that kill or train others to kill, usually
in foreign lands.53 Contracting the wholesale reconstitution of a nation’s armed forces to a private firm
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had not been attempted since the early 19th century
and remains one of the most controversial facets of
Liberia’s recovery.
However, outsourcing DDR and SSR is a trend that
will likely grow since these are not core capabilities
of the DoD, and USAID is prohibited by law from defense development. This has left a gap that the private
sector has increasingly filled in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and it will likely continue
to do so. Privatizing functions like DDR and SSR affects program outcomes, so it is important to assess
the potential impacts of this trend towards privatization. This makes Liberia an especially apt case study
since it is the first time in a century or two that a sovereign nation hired a private company to raise another
sovereign nation’s armed forces.
The Liberia program is unique even from the programs in Iraq and Afghanistan in that it was entirely
outsourced to the private sector. This was not entirely
a bad thing, contrary to some of the dire warnings
from skeptics that outsourcing any military function is
undesirable. DynCorp’s profit motive drove it to find
innovative, efficient, and effective solutions to thorny
security problems, and this accounts for some of
Liberia’s success today.
On the positive side, for example, the private sector brought a great deal of ingenuity to SSR. In 2004,
there were no books, theory, best practices, military
doctrine, compendia of lessons learned, or practitioners with significant experience on how to demobilize
and rebuild an army. Scholarship was equally unhelpful, as it has always lagged behind practice in DDR
and SSR. Owing to this, DynCorp’s team invented
new solutions to its specific DDR and SSR problems,
resulting in a sui generis program that could serve as
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an imperfect yet necessary model for future DDR and
SSR programs, and it did so in a post-conflict setting,
one of the most difficult operating environments in
the world.54
On the negative side, using private means to
achieve public ends can sometimes pit profit motive
against policy goals, and this created problems in the
public-private partnership between the United States,
DynCorp, and Liberia. Perhaps the most significant
fact of DynCorp’s work in Liberia is that the private
sector can raise an army at all. This monograph does
not fully explore these complex issues but does acknowledge them.
Decision to Outsource.
The U.S. Government did not originally intend to
make history by outsourcing the building of Liberia’s
military; necessity drove the decision. The DoS was the
client since it was responsible for managing U.S. commitments to Liberia as agreed to at Accra, including
SSR for the AFL. To this end, the DoS organized a fiveperson SSR pre-assessment trip, made from January
21 to 29, 2004, with members from the DoS and DoD.
The purpose was to better understand the general requirements for Liberia’s military SSR in advance of a
fuller assessment. After meeting with UN Chief Klein,
U.S. Ambassador Blaney, Liberian Chairman Bryant
(the title “President” was deemed inappropriate for a
interim head of government), and leaders of the AFL,
LURD, MODEL and others, the assessment team concluded that Liberia needed “a small, mobile defense
force to provide border, coastal and internal security
to support their mission” and estimated the size of the
military should be from 3,000 to 6,500 personnel.
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The pre-assessment team also observed United
Kingdom (UK) efforts to rebuild the military of neighboring Sierra Leone and determined not to use the
British model of SSR, concluding that “while IMATT
[UK’s International Military Assistance Training
Team] was initially viewed as a success story in Sierra
Leone, the UK now admit to many problems that they
have yet to resolve.” One of the primary challenges
was dismissing the combatants thought to be human
right violators while incorporating the rest into the
new security forces regardless of their faction, experience, capability, or the country’s security needs. Not
surprisingly, this did not lead to SSR success.
This is the practice of lustration, and has been performed by the international community since at least
World War II with mixed success. Lustration is the
process of culling an existing security force, retaining
desirable individuals, and dismissing the others. Examples include “denazification” (Entnazifizierung) of
the German government after World War II, Greece in
1973 after a junta took control of the government and
dismissed approximately 100,000 individuals from
government and the military, and former Communist countries after the 1990s, passing lustration laws
to drastically reduce the size of their governments,
including the security sector. Individuals not cut or
“lustrated” from the security sector are often merged
into a single security force.
Lustration can be successful, as exemplified by
denazification, or a failure, as demonstrated by “debathification” after the Iraq War. Sierra Leone was the
latter. While lustration offers a convenient political
solution for diplomats at the negotiation table, it creates significant problems on the ground, since former
enemies are expected to function together as a fighting
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team in the new army. In Sierra Leone, it resulted in
significant challenges in the quality control of troops
and the sheer number of forces, which the government
could not sustain. Also, which combatants should be
kept as “good” versus those dismissed without vetting? No serious investigation was done of combatants in Sierra Leone, which permitted undesirable
individuals in the ranks and defeated the purpose of
the program. The UN favors lustration, which it used
in the Balkans in the 1990s with mixed results. Not
surprisingly, UNMIL later used lustration to rebuild
the Liberian National Police force and achieved disappointing results, a stark contrast to the AFL.55 Owing
to this, lustration is not recommended for SSR.
Lastly, the team considered four options for who
should conduct implementation: the U.S. military
alone, the U.S. military with light contractor involvement, a contractor with light U.S. military involvement, or a contractor alone.56 They would let a second
SSR assessment trip combined with budget considerations decide the matter. The second trip took place on
May 19-26, and included some 20 experts drawn from
the DoS, the DoD’s European Command (EUCOM,
the unified command responsible for West Africa at
the time), and three companies: DynCorp, Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E), and Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI).57
The purpose of this evaluation mission—during
which one of the DoD civilian staff members was
murdered—was to determine the operational requirements for SSR of the AFL and Ministry of Defence.58
At the conclusion of the trip, the team proposed to the
U.S. embassy a restructured AFL, which it called the
New Armed Forces of Liberia (NAFL). The NAFL’s
mission would be “to defend and protect the people
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of Liberia and the sovereignty of the nation against external and internal threats and to effectively respond
to humanitarian crisis.” To achieve this, it would require an armed force of 4,020 personnel, consisting of
one light infantry brigade (three infantry battalions,
one engineer battalion, and one base support battalion), one maritime patrol battalion, one aerial reconnaissance company, one military police company, an
AFL headquarters company, and a military band.59
However, other than the NAFL’s mission and
force structure, the U.S. Government team completely
overlooked many thorny yet essential components of
SSR, among them DDR for the legacy armed forces,
a recruitment plan in a state with destroyed infrastructure and low literacy, a vetting plan for personnel in a country where war crimes were rampant and
background checks nearly impossible, the restructuring of the Ministry of Defence, leadership selection, a
national military strategy, fostering local ownership,
and the domestic political ramifications of making a
new military. There was no consideration for how Liberia’s population would receive the re-creation of the
military; many would not welcome it, given the AFL’s
troubled past, and the Accra Accords mandated that
this be addressed. On June 10, DynCorp submitted its
own 78-page assessment of SSR for the AFL to the DoS
that addressed most of these concerns.
Following the assessment mission, the DoD quickly concluded it could not conduct the SSR program
due to resource constraints and ongoing operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan.60 Consequently, the DoS was
left with a Hobson’s choice: Either outsource the entire
DDR and SSR program to the private sector or have no
program for the AFL. The DoS chose the former and
made history without meaning to.
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Purchasing a New Army.
On September 17, 2004, the DoS issued its Statement of Work (SOW) for rebuilding the Liberian military. It was only seven pages long. The objective and
scope were deceptively simple: Assist the government
of Liberia in recruiting, training, and equipping a new
military beginning with 2,000 personnel. Consultations over the summer among the DoS, DoD, DynCorp, and others concluded that the AFL should be a
2,000-person, all-volunteer force that could be scaled
upward over time. It was acknowledged that 2,000
soldiers could not defend the entire country should
a full-scale war erupt, but the size was constrained
by the government’s ability to regularly pay soldiers’
salaries, as precedent suggested unpaid soldiers were
a greater threat to Liberia’s security than an invading
army. Klein even suggested that Liberia abolish its
military altogether, quipping that African armies “sit
around playing cards and plotting coups.”61
DynCorp and PA&E both bid on the project and
after reviewing both proposals, the DoS decided to
divide the duties between the two contractors, giving
them different roles based on their expertise. DynCorp
would perform the bulk of the SSR at both the operational and institutional levels. At the operational level,
it would rebuild the AFL from the ground up, which
entailed the designing, recruiting, vetting, training,
equipping, and fielding of the new force. At the institutional level, it would also create a new Ministry
of Defence and establish systems for personnel management, intelligence, force integration and planning,
resource management, communications, information
management, public affairs, procurement and acqui-
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sition, internal audit, and other ministerial functions.
PA&E would build the logistical infrastructure, such
as roads and military bases, necessary to support the
AFL once the SSR was well under way, and also provide limited mentorship when the units were in place.
Both firms were required to construct military bases
and other facilities as needed, with DoS approval. Absent from the initial plan was the DDR of the legacy
AFL, which was originally to be conducted by the Liberian government, but later fell to DynCorp owing to
the Liberian government’s lack of capacity.
In short, DynCorp was contracted to raise an army.
The company was not contracted to perform SSR of
the entire Liberian security sector, since UNMIL was
transforming civilian actors, such as the police; and
other entities were responsible for security sector
governance, the legislature, and the national security
strategy. DynCorp’s work was limited to transforming the institutional and operational actors of the
military sub-sector. The envisioned end was as an
ethnically balanced, properly vetted, professionally
trained, civilian led, and apolitical military capable
of “defending the national sovereignty and in extremis, respond to natural disasters,” as called for by the
Accra Accords.62
DynCorp Goes to Liberia.
Three individuals spearheaded DynCorp’s effort,
including the author. Most of the first year was dedicated to designing the program, identifying implicit
tasks, and engaging key stakeholders, with the assistance of the U.S. defense attaché to Liberia. Stakeholders included the legacy force, former rebels, the host
government, the international community (those who
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were in Liberia), and civil society. Recent scholarship
suggests that DynCorp did little or no outreach to Liberians to establish local ownership.63 However, this is
incorrect: DynCorp’s chief interlocutor with Liberian
civil society was appropriately the Liberian government, primarily through Minister of Defence Daniel
Chea and later Brownie Samukai.
By July 2005, a vision for the new AFL and Ministry of Defence emerged along with guiding principles
for its reconstitution. Because the program was designed by a company and not the U.S. military, DynCorp resisted the temptation to build a large army in
the U.S. image, as has occurred in Afghanistan and
Iraq with mixed results. Instead, the firm sought to
craft—in partnership with the United States and Liberia—an armed force tailored to Liberia’s unique
regional needs.
Blueprint for the New Army.
It is impossible to truncate a multiyear, highly
complex program—with more than a few surprises—
into a monograph, and a brief timeline is included
in an Annex to provide coherence. The original plan
anticipated training beginning a few months after the
National Training Program (NTP), but pre-program
consultations and start-up operations took longer
than expected. Working in a country as sacked and
pillaged as Liberia is problematic; accomplishing even
a straightforward task in a place without infrastructure, institutions, or social trust is grueling, like war itself. As Carl von Clausewitz reminds us, “everything
in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”64
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Demobilizing the Legacy Force and Raising a New One.
Owing to the AFL’s troubled legacy during the
civil war and lack of records, lustration was viewed
as sub-optimal since it was impossible to vet who
was a “good guy.” Instead, it was agreed upon that
the old AFL should be completely demobilized and
rebuilt to ensure systematic human rights vetting of
new recruits and also assure the population that this
really was a new AFL. Though this was a controversial decision at the time, it later spared the AFL from
some of the challenges experienced by the Liberian
National Police, where UNMIL practiced lustration
resulting in a quasi-corrupt police force. But a corrupt
security force that has lost public trust and legitimacy
is a problem not easily undone. Indeed, the Liberian
National Police remain a key obstacle to peace and security in Liberia today.
The governments of Liberia and the United States
agreed that the new AFL would be open to all Liberians regardless of sex, tribe, or religion, and selection
and promotion would be based on merit rather than
cronyism or nepotism. Recruitment would maintain
a 12th-grade functional literacy standard and work
to achieve a balanced ethnic and gender mix within
the ranks. All candidates would be vigorously vetted
for past human rights abuses on an individual basis.
Training would foster an apolitical professional ethos,
especially in the leadership, that respected the rule
of law, cultivated an ethos of public service, and accepted civilian control of the military.65 Throughout
the DDR and SSR process, DynCorp would manage
a public sensitization program crafted mostly by local
Liberians rather than international media consultants.
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One key advantage that Liberia had over Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere is security. First, UNMIL maintained an overwhelming force in the small
country, with over 15,000 peacekeepers who acted as
deterrent and hammer. This is in contrast with Iraq
and Afghanistan, where coalition forces were spread
too thin across an immense landscape and could not
control it, a clear violation of T. E. Lawrence’s “Algebraic Principle.”66 Also, Liberians genuinely had war
fatigue, in the author’s opinion. Few desired to return
to a state of unbridled horror as demonstrated by Doe
and Taylor and were content to let the UN take over.
Consequently, there was no significant insurgent
movement to challenge the peacekeeping force. This
might grimly suggest that post-conflict recovery best
begins after war has run its course.
Human Security as Unifying Concept.
After DynCorp’s initial assessment of Liberia’s defense sector in May 2004, the company had judged that
the greatest risks to Liberian security were not strong
neighboring states with powerful armies threatening
invasions, but rather violent street crime, criminal militias, disease and poverty, armed insurrection, food
insecurity, lack of access to justice and political representation, terrorism, and a dearth of the basic necessities of life—all internally driven conditions arising
from failures of development and good governance.
Armed nonstate actors could exploit these public
grievances for active or passive support. Examples
of active support include providing logistical help or
sanctuary to militias; passive support entails not cooperating with authorities regarding the whereabouts
and activities of anti-government groups. Doe, Tay-
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lor, LURD, and MODEL all depended on both types
of support in their rise to power.
Based on this threat assessment, DynCorp believed
Liberians (and the DoS) would judge the AFL’s success by its ability to secure development rather than
repel invaders.67 Historically, when the U.S. military
builds foreign armies, it attempts to create a force that
mirrors its own: conventional units strong enough
to physically defend the borders against armed aggressors and also project force abroad when needed.
Strong armies are effective at waging regular warfare—interstate, military-on-military engagements,
also known as “conventional war” like World War
II—but less so when dealing with irregular threats
and nonstate actors that gain support and sanctuary
by exploiting popular grievances that stem from failures of development and good governance, as was the
case in Liberia.68
Accordingly, DynCorp abandoned the regular approach to SSR and adopted a novel paradigm when
designing the Liberian defense architecture and strategy—”human security”—marking one of the earliest
attempts to operationalize this idea. The conventional
model of “national security” privileges its namesake:
states. Steeped in the Westphalian tradition, the primary geopolitical actor is the state, which survives by
checking other states’ power though the Machiavellian calculus of national interests and balance-of-power politics, with military might as the ultimate arbiter.
Westphalian warfare is the war of Clausewitz, World
Wars I and II, nominally obeys the “laws of war,” and
constitutes “regular” warfare. Such a paradigm holds
that if one secures the state, then security will cascade
from the state down to the regime, community, and
finally the individual.
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The human security paradigm is the exact opposite. It best suits the non-Westphalian world of Africa
and elsewhere, where states did not develop organically as they did in Europe and North America but
rather were invented by cartographers in London,
Paris, Berlin, and other colonizing powers of the past.
Not surprisingly, this is a world were “irregular” warfare is more regular than “regular” warfare, as nonstate actors fight without regard for the laws of war
that regulate interstate conflict.
Human security was a concept first articulated in
the 1994 UN Development Program’s (UNDP) Human
Development Report and views security and development as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing.
The report argues that national security matters less
when “several states are beginning to disintegrate,”
and the primary threats to global insecurity stem from
failures of development—drugs, AIDS, terrorism, pollution, nuclear proliferation, and corruption—rather
than strong rival states, as the Westphalian national
security model presumes. These new threats “respect
no national border,” and “the search for human security lies in development, not in arms.”69 Consequently,
the human security approach holds that if the individual is secured, then security will emanate to the community, regime, and finally the state. The national and
human security paradigms are opposite understandings on how human communities are best protected
(see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. National Versus Human
Security Paradigms.
Owing to the threat assessment, DynCorp believed
the human security paradigm would be a more appropriate model for the design and deployment of the
AFL than the conventional national security one. Specifically, this meant de-emphasizing traditional missions, like defending national borders with a massive
military, and securing development as the unifying
concept behind the new AFL. The DoS and the Liberian government agreed with this idea, and in 2006,
the author assisted the Minister of Defence in drafting
the National Defence Strategy (NDS) white paper based
on human security, making Liberia one of the first
countries to try to operationalize human security in its
military. The first sentence of the draft reads: “There
can be no development without adequate security,
nor can security be maintained without development
and the benefits it promises for our population.”70
From there, the strategy explained the relationship
between security and development in the context of
Liberia, identified Liberia’s core security interests in
light of development, and outlined the principles that
informed AFL SSR. Beyond this, the strategy remained
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vague and not fully operational, and ultimately was
transmuted into a more conventional defense strategy
by external parties. However, human security ideas
infused the SSR program, such as integrating civics
and literacy classes as the major component of basic
training, establishing an ethnically balanced force
that is inclusive of women, creating an ombudsman
position at Ministry of Defence, and holding peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance as central
military missions.
The force structure of the new AFL and Ministry
of Defence was designed to be strong enough to repel limited cross-border attacks but not so strong as
to threaten Liberia’s neighbors. This entailed a small,
basic, well-trained motorized light infantry regiment
without heavy or expensive weaponry, such as artillery, armor, or fighter planes. The plan also proscribed
the creation of special forces and other secretive, elite
units that could easily become politicized killing machines, as the former Anti Terrorist Unit, the Special
Anti Terrorist Unit, the Black Berets, the Special Security Service, and the Special Operations Division
became during the civil war. Political leaders had
abused these units in the past, using them as sectarian hit squads. The U.S. and Liberian governments did
not wish to see a relapse of this tragic pattern.
On July 17, 2005, DynCorp proposed an initial
force structure and table of organization and equipment (TO&E)—the blueprint for the new AFL—to the
DoS. A TO&E is a master inventory of all personnel
and equipment within the military, delineating for
each unit the exact number, rank, title, and military
occupational specialty of every individual and the
name and quantity of each piece of equipment. Several
models of the AFL and MOD were considered, includ-
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ing ones with agricultural battalions so the AFL could
source its own food (rejected because it could lead to
corruption within the ranks) and a robust engineer
battalion to help rebuild the country and strengthen
bonds with the local populace (rejected because it was
too expensive).
The initial blueprint presented to and approved
by the DoS in 2005 called for an AFL of just under
2,000 soldiers, comprising a brigade headquarters
company, two light infantry battalions, an engineer
company, a military police company, a training company, a military band, and three military personnel
(in the Ministry of Defence). The Ministry of Defence
was a lean 100 people, and all but three were civilians.
This blueprint has changed over time, but the original
concept for the AFL remains.
Program Stages.
The SSR program was originally envisaged as
proceeding in several steps. In reality, the program’s
progression was ambiguous and fluid due to intervening challenges, though in retrospect, it had three
relatively distinct phases. During this time, security
was provided by UNMIL’s large peacekeeping force.
Phase I began when the DoS decided to outsource
the SSR program to the private sector and involved a
small team of contractors to design the program and
meet with stakeholders. Phase II commenced on May
15, 2005, when Chairman Bryant signed Executive
Order Number Five authorizing the full demobilization of the legacy AFL on June 30, 2005.71 After this,
the DoS issued DynCorp an NTP for the program in
full, and the company began to recruit and train staff
(both local and international), acquire compounds

53

and equipment for operations, construct a customized DDR site outside of Monrovia, demobilize 13,770
members of the legacy AFL, plan the public sensitization campaign regarding the AFL reconstitution, and
formulate a systematic recruiting and vetting plan.
Phase III began in January 2006 with the completion of the old force’s demobilization and the start of
recruiting the new force. This phase involved a national public sensitization and recruiting campaign,
rigorous vetting, creation of a basic training or initial
entry training (IET) course, and Ministry of Defence
training. It also required equipping the new force, legally purchasing and shipping arms to Liberia from
Eastern Europe, and building the necessary bases.
Determining entry standards for recruitment in the
hopes of instilling a professional, apolitical ethos that
placed service to the country above tribe or individual
was problematic. Many Liberians were not sufficiently literate. Attracting women to the AFL was difficult
because men historically filled the ranks. Vetting candidates and selecting leadership was complicated by a
lack of public records. All AFL policies had to be created, while simultaneously transforming the Ministry
of Defence, hiring and training all its civilian personnel, and synchronizing its development with that of
the larger government.
Phase IV entailed fielding the new force and program termination. PA&E was responsible for constructing all nontraining military facilities, settling individual soldiers into units once they left training, and
providing unit mentors. In 2009, Liberia’s two infantry battalions underwent a certification exercise modeled on the U.S. Army Readiness Training Evaluation
Program (ARTEP). The contract ended in 2010, and
a team of 60 U.S. Marines begin a 5-year mentorship
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program with the AFL called Operation ONWARD
LIBERTY.72 Today, the AFL continues its development, transformed from an instrument of terror into
one of stability. The International Crisis Group (ICG),
a watchdog nongovernmental organization (NGO),
assessed that “the SSR program, in particular army
reform, is a provisional success.”73
As with any complex, high stakes, post-conflict
program, there were many problems. Problems internal to the program are examined in the text to follow.
There were also many external surprises that slowed
the program, costing the United States money, the
company time, and Liberia its defense. Construction
was expensive and delayed, as many materials had to
be imported, theft was rampant, and concrete did not
dry well in the monsoon-like rainy season from April
to September. Building the new training base—and all
training—was suspended for 8 months as Liberia, the
United States, and UNMIL debated the base’s location. Finally, in July 2006, the former Voice of America transmitter site was selected at Careysburg and
rechristened the Sandee S. Ware Military Barracks.74
DynCorp started construction once the occupying
UNMIL units moved off site, which took much longer
than expected. Another major surprise was the NTGL’s inability to safely demobilize the legacy AFL, as
was originally planned in 2004. By the spring of 2005,
it became evident to the DoS that the NTGL could
not demobilize its own troops, so it asked DynCorp
to do so.
Chief among the challenges of Phase II was demobilizing Liberia’s standing army peacefully, while
continuing to maintain security. This included determining who was eligible for demobilization benefits,
finding donor money to pay for those benefits, trying
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to prevent fraud, and anticipating unwelcome public
response amid fears that disgruntled demobilized soldiers would incite political violence. Building the site
on the outskirts of Monrovia involved its own challenges: finding competent construction companies,
theft of materials, and significant delays caused by the
rainy season. Other unexpected obstacles arose.
Razing an Army: Que Sera Sera.
Demobilizing a standing African army is tricky.
Few—if any—modern African armies have faded
away peacefully, as demonstrated by Liberia’s neighbor, Côte d’Ivoire. Attempts by the U.S. military to
retire forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have often led to
greater insurgency and violence. In Liberia, there was
no such resistance. By the time the UN intervened,
there seemed to be genuine war fatigue in the country,
but the lack of violence is also due to the manner in
which DynCorp demobilized the old AFL.
On May 18, 2005, Chairman Bryant publicly proclaimed Executive Order Number Five at a national
press conference in the presidential palace; as his entourage departed, the AFL band played “Que Sera
Sera.” The order, which had the force of law, declared the entire AFL officially decommissioned on
June 30, 2005. Afterwards, Minster of Defence Chea
told reporters that the demobilization exercise would
take place in the months ahead and would be done
by DynCorp, expressing confidence in the company.
At the time, there was a real fear that members of the
AFL would dig up cached weapons and challenge the
authority of the state or demand greater remuneration
in exchange for cooperation. Luckily, no such violence
occurred, but it was a constant worry: For example,
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in April 2006, 400 to 500 ex-soldiers threatened there
would be “no Christmas” if they did not receive salary
arrears for their service.75
Immediately following the chairman’s announcement, DynCorp got to work. First, it coordinated with
UNMIL to provide security during the demobilization in case violence erupted—though the company’s
small armed presence would have been insufficient to
put down a large armed riot. Next, the company subcontracted a local architecture and engineering firm
to custom build a demobilization site on the outskirts
of Monrovia, which was close enough to the city to
be accessible for the majority of the population yet far
enough to contain a violent outbreak before it spread
to the capital. DynCorp also began refurbishing the
Barclay Training Centre, a former AFL base in downtown Monrovia, and would later build the larger
training base in Careysburg.
DynCorp’s ability to rapidly demobilize the legacy
AFL was aided by circumstance since it did not have
to disarm combatants or determine who was eligible
for benefits, both dangerous and time-consuming issues. UNMIL’s DDRR (the extra “R” stands for Rehabilitation) program had already disarmed but not
demobilized ex-AFL soldiers, who were confined to
their barracks. However, as with LURD and MODEL,
it was widely believed that the AFL’s best weapons
remained hidden rather than surrendered to UNMIL
as a hedge against future hostilities. UNMIL collected few heavy or crew-served weapons despite their
prevalence during the civil war, casting a shadow of
anxiety over the entire process.
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The NTGL rather than DynCorp decided who was
eligible for demobilization benefits. Based on available funding, DynCorp derived a points system to
distribute payment to ex-AFL fighters based on time
in service and rank, which the NTGL approved and
adopted. The minimum payment to help soldiers reintegrate into civil society was $540 (about a year’s
salary) and the maximum was over $2,000, substantially more than the flat $300 UNMIL offered nongovernment combatants in its DDRR program. Like so
many other DDR programs, little was done to ensure
long-term reintegration. Once individuals received
their payments, they usually were offered transport to
their home town and then forgotten. There was little,
if any, serious job training, counseling, or similar assistance to prevent them from relying on violence to
make a living. Also, there was no separate assistance
for dependents of former soldiers, aside from the 270
widows who received compensation only after vociferous and persistent political protests to the Liberian
government. But to be fair to DynCorp, it was not
contracted to provide long-term assistance for former
soldiers, only to demobilize them safely.
Not surprisingly, many Liberians fraudulently
claimed they were in the AFL and demanded payment; determining who was actually in the AFL was
difficult. First, nearly all the AFL personnel records
were destroyed in the war. Second, many combatants took a nom de guerre during the war: memorable
warlords include General Cobra, General Mosquito,
General Mosquito Spray, General Peanut-Butter (currently a senator), and General Butt Naked (currently
a preacher), whose warriors fought au naturel. Lastly,
there was widespread fraud and abuse during UNMIL’s DDRR process, as later vetting investigations
revealed, giving precedent to cheating the system.76
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In reference to the previous discussion, a large
re-documentation exercise was launched to ascertain
who was truly in the AFL, which the NTGL led and
DynCorp operationalized. The executive order established a joint Demobilization Advisory Monitoring
Committee (DAMC) to oversee the process, which
did not include the firm.77 Initially, well over 15,000
individuals claimed to be former AFL, but this list
was painstakingly whittled down. UNMIL identified several hundred double dippers—Liberians who
had already received benefits from UNMIL’s DDRR
program posing as members of LURD or MODEL.
These individuals were disqualified from receiving
additional pay-outs. The AFL leadership also reconstructed former unit rosters drawn from fragments
of surviving records and considered every claim individually, using eight criteria to validate a veteran’s
identity.78 Suspicious candidates were quizzed on
life in the AFL: which unit they were in, where they
served, who were their commanding officers and first
sergeants. By the end of July, the NTGL produced a
list of 13,500 ex-AFL members eligible for benefits and
added 270 widows later for a total of 13,770.
Concurrent to these events, DynCorp and a senior
member of the Ministry of Defence co-led a planning
team of eight AFL officers that reported directly to the
defense minister.79 The team issued a military operations order that provided a demobilization schedule
for all 27 units, a three-stage plan of action for the process (identity verification, registration, and payment),
and logistical requirements and taskings.80 Though
successful, this hybrid team, led by a Liberian and a
contractor, raised questions over where the NTGL’s
influence ended and DynCorp’s began. The company
had to manage significant portions of the process ow-
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ing to the NTGL’s lack of capacity, which raised concerns over who truly controlled the process.
The NTGL and DynCorp imbued the process with
dignity, which encouraged participation. After years
of war rife with human rights violations, it was tempting to treat the AFL as criminals rather than soldiers.
This would have been a mistake. First, not everyone
in the AFL committed war crimes. Second, criminalizing the process only would have alienated former AFL
and deterred their cooperation, which was essential to
the program. DynCorp consciously framed the demobilization as a retirement, modeled on the U.S. Army’s
own protocol, rather than a DDR pay-out to “thugs.”
Every day, a unit mustered at the demobilization site
to be honored with a formal ceremony replete with
protocol, the AFL band, and a congratulatory speech
by the Minister of Defence or similar dignitary. Individuals then began the demobilization process, which
verified and logged their identity, took an identification picture, and electronically fingerprinted them
(see Figure 3). Following this, ex-soldiers received a
voucher for payment at a Monrovian bank as well as
a demobilization certificate and a card indicating that
they were either “demobilized” or “honorably retired”
(for those whose service began before Taylor’s takeover). These documents were intended to provide a
measure of closure and status to ex-combatants, but
also, as official government papers, they represented
the state’s reconstitution after a long absence.
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Figure 3. One of 15 Demobilization Stations
with Biometric Capture at
DynCorp’s Custom-Built Demobilization Site.
Cynics might argue this was merely political theater, yet, to date, it has been successful: The legacy
military remains peacefully demobilized. Moreover, it
was done safely and efficiently. By treating ex-combatants as soldiers rather than criminals, in 4 months
and at a cost of only $15 million, one of the more notorious armies in Africa was completely and safely demobilized, a rare event in African history.81 DynCorp’s
ability to demobilize an army exemplifies what the
private military industry can do and perhaps where it
is heading within the new neo-medieval order. In the
new market for force, like the old, dismantling armed
challengers is the first step to gaining a monopoly of
force, whether it is for a client like Liberia—or the
PMC’s own interests.
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Raising an Army in Five Steps.
DynCorp’s experience raising a small army for
Liberia shows how PMCs today can build a military.
Unlike PMC experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan,
DynCorp raised an army with no support from the
DoD and minimal assistance from the U.S. Government, other than payment. This is significant because
it demonstrates the capability of the private sector to
generate security forces today. Nor is DynCorp unique
in its capacity.
Raising an army is obviously complex, and a full
analysis of how it is done is beyond the scope of this
monograph. Instead, an overview of five key elements
of army building, all managed by DynCorp in Liberia,
are discussed: (1) public sensitization, (2) recruiting,
(3) vetting, (4) training and equipping, and (5) formulating strategy and institutional support.
Step 1: Alert the Public.
The first step in creating a new force—unless it is
clandestine—is to alert the public. In Liberia, this was
challenging, owing to the grim legacy of the former
AFL in the war. Many Liberians, and even UNMIL’s
Jacques Klein, did not welcome this development and
thought the country ought to adopt the Costa Rican
model of a robust national police force in lieu of a military. However, ultimately it was decided during the
Accra Peace Accords that Liberia needed a military
because of the dangerous geopolitics of West Africa.
To help prepare the populace for this, DynCorp began
planning a public sensitization program in early 2005.
Major obstacles of any foreign-led messaging campaign are cultural and language barriers, and Liberia
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has 16 different tribes with their own customs and
languages. The widely-spoken Liberian English is not
easily recognizable to international English speakers,
as it is a creole of Kru pidgin English and 19th-century
African American vernacular English.82 Moreover,
the 14-year dearth of education due to the civil war
and resultant 75 percent illiteracy rate limited much
communication to oral or pictorial transmission. Due
to these challenges, DynCorp sought to partner with
a local communications firm and employed Liberians
to craft effective messages that would resonate with
indigenous audiences. DynCorp’s role was confined
mostly to logistical support and coordination with international community representatives in Liberia.
The communications strategy was a combined sensitization and recruitment campaign targeting opinion
leaders, civil society, and the AFL recruitment pool.
It consisted of several parallel efforts. The first was a
series of workshops for senior AFL officers, cabinet
members, soldiers to be demobilized, the media, and
civil society groups. The second was a broader outreach campaign to the public as a whole and involved
members of the government and the AFL SSR program who gave interviews to the media, debated on
radio talk shows, staged rallies featuring other senior
members of the government (see Figure 4), produced
radio dramas featuring the AFL, placed ads in newspapers, displayed large AFL billboards and murals
(see Figure 5), and recruited tours in Liberia’s hinterlands (see Figure 6). DynCorp even commissioned
AFL comic books titled Jackie’s Adventure and Liberia’s
New Armed Forces for free distribution (see Figure 7).
The company also set up two information booths in
downtown Monrovia staffed by Liberians to answer
any questions passers-by had regarding the AFL SSR
process or how to enlist.
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Figure 4. The Liberian Minister of National Defence
Brownie Samukai at a Rally for the AFL,
Coordinated by DynCorp in Monrovia, 2006.

Figure 5. The Author Standing in Front
of an AFL Billboard Alerting the Public to the
New Armed Forces of Liberia.
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Figure 6. Part of a DynCorp Recruiting Convoy into
the Hinterlands of Liberia.

Figure 7. DynCorp commissioned comic books to
reach low-literacy audiences aimed at sharing
information regarding the new AFL as well as
encourage recruitment, especially among
women in this case.
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Despite DynCorp’s efforts to localize the campaign by hiring locals to help design it, many Liberians found it bumbling and even insulting. The use of
well-dressed and healthy-looking children on some of
the AFL recruiting posters was not well received by a
population traumatized by child soldiers. Many asked
whether the children on the posters were American,
given their health. This demonstrated a lack of cultural sensitivity on the part of the campaign designers,
partly because the messages were not thoroughly tested on Liberian focus groups before they went public.
Similarly, the comic books received mixed reactions;
they were an effective tool for illiterate audiences but
repelled some educated Liberians, who found them
infantilizing.
Worse, DynCorp’s attempt to combine sensitization and recruiting into a single campaign to conserve
resources and time muddled messages and hampered
the efficacy of both. In many ways, these two information efforts are incompatible. The objective of the
sensitization program is to alert the public to the new
military’s formation in the most transparent and neutral manner possible, whereas the purpose of recruitment is advocacy by framing information in a highly
positive way to encourage enlistment. DynCorp chose
to prioritize recruitment over sensitization, which
should not be a surprise. After all, it was hired to raise
an army, not facilitate a civil society discourse on the
role of the new AFL: Too much indigenous criticism of
what it was doing could have resulted in the DoS cancelling its contract. But this lack of transparency and
civil society engagement is an important component
of SSR, as it inculcates ownership and acceptance of
the new AFL.
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Step 2: Recruiting.
Recruitment for the new AFL began on January 18,
2006, at the Barclay Training Center (BTC) in downtown Monrovia and attracted a great deal of attention,
with a line wrapping nearly around the block (see
Figure 8). Large groups of applicants even camped in
front of the BTC for several nights before the opening
day, and individuals travelled from outlying counties
to stand for the chance to apply. In the first 2 months
alone, DynCorp processed 4,000 applications.

Figure 8. The First Day of Recruiting
Attracted a Long Line of Volunteers.
Most of the recruiting took place at the BTC because a third of the population was encamped at
Monrovia, making it fertile enlisting ground, and BTC
also had the infrastructure to support the operation.
Neither the Liberian government nor the DoS desired
an all-Monrovian military, but access to Liberia’s interior was very limited. The few roads and bridges
that existed were in poor shape, and some were im-
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passable during the rainy season. To overcome this,
DynCorp conducted large recruiting expeditions with
the precision and robustness of a military operation.
Each so-called forward recruiting convoy consisted of
some dozen or so trucks, 50 staff, and all necessary
equipment, including spare vehicles. They would deploy days and even weeks at a time to all 14 counties
in Liberia and could process about 120 applicants a
day. Like a military column, these forward recruitment operations consisted of several parts. Ahead of
the main convoy, a reconnaissance team scouted the
routes, conducted liaisons with relevant UN and Liberian authorities, and identified recruitment sites.
Next, a public affairs team made radio announcements and distributed posters and comic books.
Then the forward recruiting team’s main body arrived, making announcements over truck-mounted
speakers while driving through population centers.
In the first 6 months of 2006, DynCorp launched 28
recruiting expeditions.
The final phase of the recruitment campaign was,
of course, the recruitment itself. DynCorp devised a
four-stage recruitment process—enlistment, a literacy
aptitude test, a physical fitness test, and a medical
exam—to select the best candidates from the recruitment pool. The stages were sequential: Applicants
had to pass minimum acceptability standards before
advancing to the next stage. To save money, DynCorp
conducted less expensive tests first when the applicant
pool was large, and more costly tests last when the applicant pool was smallest. This process is illustrated
in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Recruiting Process.
The first stage of recruitment was enlistment. Applicants had to be Liberian citizens between the ages
of 18 and 35, functionally literate at a 12th grade level
for enlisted soldiers and at a college graduate level for
officers, physically fit and healthy, without a criminal record, and free of allegations of human rights
violations, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.
Applicants showed up at a recruitment station and
were searched for weapons, then asked to read a few
simple sentences to ensure basic literacy (a fuller literacy exam ensued later); 11.5 percent failed this and
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were escorted off the premises. Applicants who could
read were briefed on the AFL and the recruitment process. If individuals wished to volunteer to serve, they
filed an enlistment application, received an AFL recruitment identity card with their picture and unique
tracking number, and were given a report date for the
second stage.
The second stage was assessing functional literacy.
Soldiers had to be able to read and write orders, reports, maps, and other communications, a significant
recruiting challenge in a country with 75 percent illiteracy. Because of this, DynCorp suggested a minimum 6th-grade reading level, but the Liberian government insisted on a 12th-grade level. Instead of
relying on disparate and potentially fraudulent diplomas, DynCorp asked the West African Examinations
Council (WAEC), a regional organization, to create
an aptitude test that the company could administer.
WAEC is a not-for-profit examination board that has
administered standardized tests for 6th and 12th graders throughout the region since 1952. WAEC created
a 90-minute aptitude test consisting of 30 multiplechoice questions and one essay to test for educational
equivalency. If the applicant passed the aptitude test,
he or she was invited to return the next day for a
physical fitness test and medical exam; if the applicant failed the aptitude test, (s)he was given one more
chance to retake the test in 28 days’ time. Female candidates tended to score higher than males, and unlike
in a developed country, younger Liberians on average
did worse than older applicants, owing to the lack of
schooling during the 14-year civil war. Fifty-eight percent of applicants passed this stage.
The third stage assessed physical aptitude. Obviously, strong physical prowess is a prerequisite for
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soldiering, and DynCorp modified the U.S. Army’s
physical fitness test to assess it, because the test required no special equipment or venue. To pass the
test, applicants had to complete a minimum number
of push-ups and sit-ups in a 2-minute time frame and
run 1.5 miles in less than a specified time, depending on age and gender. Only 7.6 percent of applicants
failed the fitness test, and these could retest in 28 days.
Of those who failed, 58 percent failed to do the minimum required push-ups, 36 percent failed to complete
the minimum required sit-ups, and 6 percent did not
finish the 1.5 mile run in the maximum time allotted.
Not surprisingly, applicants older than 34 had a higher failure rate than younger candidates, although the
rate never exceeded 20 percent for any age group. Forty-eight percent of original applicants passed through
this stage.
Next, applicants underwent a basic medical examination consisting of a general check-up, a drug screen,
a tuberculosis test, and an HIV-AIDS test. Unlike the
other tests, applicants who failed this exam were denied entry into the AFL unless it was for a temporary
illness or the need of corrective lenses, in which case
the applicant could return for a reexamination. Surprisingly, only 11.9 percent failed the medical examination during the first 6 months, mostly due to illegal
drug use. Liberia has a relatively high HIV-AIDS rate,
but the recruitment campaign’s active dissemination
of minimum entry standards may have deterred those
afflicted from volunteering.
In sum, the purpose of the recruiting process is to
select the best qualified individuals for service. However, this is not limited to technical skills alone. A key
aspect of SSR is ensuring that no person of improper
character is accepted into the new force, and this requires careful vetting of applicants.
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Step 3. Vetting.
Vetting is perhaps the most important, yet inexplicably overlooked, element of raising security forces.
Recruiting soldiers or policemen without proper background checks would be unthinkable in the United
States, yet it has happened routinely in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflict affected states, which arguably
need professional security services the most. The lack
of rigorous vetting allows terrorists and criminals to
easily infiltrate security forces and commit crimes in
uniform, discrediting, and corrupting the force, while
terrorizing the populace. On February 22, 2006, insurgents posing as Iraqi police destroyed the Golden
Mosque in Samarra, one of Iraq’s holiest Shiite shrines,
re-igniting long-standing violence between Sunni and
Shia in Iraq. This problem became so widespread in
the Iraqi national police that in 2007, the U.S. Congress
appointed a high-level independent commission headed by retired general James Jones, the former NATO
commander, to assess the situation. The commission’s
recommendation was grim: “We should start over,”
meaning the SSR of the Iraqi police. But as an earlier
inspector general report on the same topic observed,
a corrupt security force that has lost public trust and
legitimacy is “a problem not easily undone.”83
One reason vetting is ignored is because it is hard.
How does one conduct background checks in a failed
state where there are few, if any, records kept? Background investigations normally rely on a plethora of
records: criminal, commercial, financial, educational,
and public. In a post-conflict failed state, such records
may not have survived the war, if they existed in the
first place; they also may be incomplete or not cred-
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ible. In Liberia, what records remained were scant, incomplete, and generally untrustworthy, since forgery
and identity theft were common. The AFL’s personnel or G-1 Section of the Ministry of Defence had lost
most of its filing systems, including the 201 files of its
Military Personnel Record Jacket, which had documents on each soldier. Compounding the issue was
the sheer number of problematic candidates, where
many people were perpetrators or victims (or both)
of violence during the war. The lack of tools plus the
large volume of troubled backgrounds made human
rights vetting a daunting challenge.
Vetting was also dangerous. Many did not welcome unearthing the bloody past, especially violent
individuals under investigation with something to
hide. If the vetting process failed to safeguard the
identities of victims and witnesses who helped identify perpetrators, then those victims or SSR staff could
be intimidated, coerced, and even killed in reprisal. If
the vetting process accidentally admitted a war criminal, it would discredit all vetted individuals and perhaps even provoke a violent backlash. Wrongful denunciations made against innocent individuals could
generate antagonism in the community and discredit
the SSR program as a whole, deterring people from
enlisting in the new army and defeating the purpose
of the SSR effort.
DynCorp thus created an entirely novel approach
to human rights vetting in post-conflict countries
which the ICG says is “a notable success—the best,
several experts said, they had witnessed anywhere
in the world.”84 It combined investigative techniques,
international best practices, and human rights norms
to judge a candidate’s character and capacity for a
position of trust and to identify potential risks for
security reasons.
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We would never put a policeman or a soldier on the
streets of a U.S. city without a thorough background
check, yet such precautions are frequently neglected in
conflict zones. To date, no public military or government has developed a systematic method for vetting
in fragile states, which accounts for difficulties in Iraq
and Afghanistan, for instance, where insurgents easily
infiltrate the security forces and commit crimes in uniform. To avoid spoilers subverting the AFL, DynCorp
invested in developing a new vetting model and did
so more efficiently than the U.S. military, taking just a
few months with a handful of experts. The U.S. military did not rigorously vet individuals who wished to
serve in the Afghan, Iraqi, or similar security forces,
despite its centrality to effective SSR.
The process utilized three methods: background
checks, records checks, and public vetting. The vetting staff was compartmentalized from the recruiting
office to avoid conflict of interest issues or selection
bias. Once an applicant’s file was passed to the vetting office, it was assigned to a background investigator, who worked closely with Liberian colleagues. The
purpose was to establish the overall truthfulness of the
applicants’ claims about themselves and uncover evidence of past wrongdoing that would disqualify them
from serving. During enlistment, applicants filled out
a detailed questionnaire about their backgrounds,
which included their age, schooling, work history,
claimed special skills, a strip-map to their home (there
are few street signs in war-ravaged Liberia), and any
supporting evidence, such as certificates or diplomas.
An investigator then verified the accuracy of this information; fraudulent claims and documents filed in
the applications account for the majority of candidate
disqualifications during the vetting process.
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The first vetting method is background checks. Conducting background checks in a post-conflict country
is complex and absolutely requires local knowledge.
Owing to this, each investigative team comprised
one Liberian and one international investigator. This
team interviewed people on conditions of anonymity
who knew the candidate well for character references,
which included the candidate’s references, neighbors,
employers, co-workers, relatives, municipal authorities, teachers, community leaders, and local religious
leaders (see Figure 10). To ensure interviews were controlled, confidential, and conducive to maximum disclosure, investigators tried to conduct them in private
locations and use open-ended questions (e.g., “tell me
about this man”). Because of the sensitive nature of
investigating the past, local Liberian staff were vital as
cultural interpreters and almost always accompanied
the investigator. Without their support, competent investigations would not have been possible.

Figure 10. A DynCorp Vetting Team Comprising
One International and One Liberian Expert
Conducting Background Checks on an AFL
Applicant in the Field.
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Second, the vetting team ran a records check on
the applicant, pooling what public records were available and prioritizing them by reliability and completeness. In its records search, DynCorp reached out to
the full pantheon of neo-medieval actors in Liberia:
the government of Liberia, UNMIL, and other international organizations as well as international and
local NGOs.85 The West Africa Examinations Council
(WAEC) maintained some of the best identity records
in the country, with thousands of Liberian identities
plus photographs on file. Despite the incompleteness
of the records, they helped investigators verify facts
and spot forged documents and falsehoods.
Third, DynCorp conducted public vetting, a direct
appeal to the population to solicit local knowledge
of candidates’ past wrongdoings. The candidates’
pictures, names, and hometowns were publicized
nationally to afford witnesses and victims an opportunity to identify undesirable candidates. Candidates
were briefed of this procedure during enlistment and
signed a release form authorizing DynCorp to broadcast their information. The company used posters,
newspaper inserts, radio, and facebooks to disseminate the information and invited the public to provide
feedback anonymously via telephone hotlines, an
email address, or simply walking into an enlistment
center. Additionally, some members of the public
with special knowledge of past crimes, such as solicitors, academic researchers, civil society groups, and
journalists, were, at times, asked to submit relevant
information concerning the human rights records of
persons named on the list. Not surprisingly, public vetting in Liberia attracted many false leads and
fraudulent claims aimed at defaming candidates for
unrelated reasons, but in a country with few public re-
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cords, tapping the collective memory of the populace
was an important vetting method.
Applicants could be disqualified on substantial
and/or procedural grounds. Substantial reasons involve credible evidence of past wrongdoing—criminality, human rights violations, drug use, mental
instability, etc.—that would be undesirable behavior in the new security forces. To this end, DynCorp
compiled a list of “core crimes” that would disqualify
candidates. These were drawn from crimes commonly outlawed in humanitarian and human rights law,
specifically genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and grave human rights abuses. Examples of
core crimes include murder, rape, and torture. Individuals who were members of security units with especially bad human rights records were not dismissed
categorically: All applicants received a fair investigation. Procedural grounds entailed credible evidence of
wrongdoing internal to the vetting process itself, such
as cheating, lying, or noncooperation in course of the
investigation. In other words, substantial grounds
dealt with factors external to the vetting process, while
procedural grounds dealt with issues internal to the
process itself. Both assessed an individual’s integrity
and character, and either justified the rejection of an
applicant from the indigenous force.
What should be the threshold of evidence for disqualification? Theoretically, the threshold criteria for
rejection of an applicant follow a simple formula:
level of gravity of crime + level of evidence, balanced
against other competing interests (e.g., member of an
underrepresented ethnic group, applicant possesses a
rare and needed skill set, etc.). Realistically, this is a
tricky question and has no generalizable answer. Several standards exist for determining the quality or level
of evidence, yet none are wholly satisfactory. Setting
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standards too low results in an “open door model”
that risks insurgents and criminals easily infiltrating
the force. Setting them too high creates a “trial model”
that would be inappropriate and protract the process.
Since vetting is used to determine an applicant’s
suitability for military service rather than establishing guilt or innocence of crimes, DynCorp adopted
a lower standard of proof than would courts of law,
disqualifying candidates based on a preponderance of
evidence or “balance of probability.” In other words,
an applicant would be dismissed if he or she was more
likely than not culpable in a crime. This standard is
generally utilized for civil law trials and is widely accepted in adjudicating human rights cases, such as by
the European Court of Human Rights. The “balance
of probabilities” standard is an injunction to evaluate
whether a given element is “more probable than not”
and most suitable for SSR vetting.
When weighing the testimony of witnesses, DynCorp created a matrix that explained and ranked the
trustworthiness of sources in four categories: identity,
character, education, and professional experience. For
each of these categories, the company gave guidelines regarding the types of persons who were most
and least trustworthy. Strongly credible witnesses included people who knew the candidate well, such as a
close relative or a friend who knew the candidate for
15 years or more (e.g., spouse, parent, or old friend)
or people in positions of authority over the individual
(e.g., high school principal, church pastor, or boss).
Weak witnesses only vaguely knew the candidate;
in such cases, the investigator needed to substantiate
the charge with at least two or three unrelated witnesses. Allegations with few credible witnesses were
generally deemed not probable and did not disqualify
the applicant.
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In addition to allegations of war crimes or human
rights violations, histories of criminal behavior, poor
reputations in the community, mental instability, and
family violence, candidates could be rejected for procedural reasons that cast negative light on their suitability for soldiering. The top reasons for procedural
disqualification included failure to reveal pertinent information during the procedure; evidence of threats,
intimidation, or coercion of victims, references, or witnesses; lack of cooperation with or support for the vetting process; or aggressive, violent, insulting, or disrespectful behavior toward staff. In the first 6 months of
recruiting and vetting, 1,080 candidates were investigated; of these, 335 were accepted and 205 were rejected, almost all for procedural rather than substantive
reasons. This may be because the recruiting campaign
stressed the need for candidates free of criminal or human rights violations in their background, and thus
the applicant pool was self-selecting. It may also be
because procedural problems were easier to unearth
than substantive ones.
Importantly, DynCorp did not admit or dismiss
any applicant based on vetting: This was the job of the
Joint Personnel Board (JPB). Once a candidate passed
all recruiting requirements and completed the vetting process, DynCorp scored their merit based on
how well they did in each category, ranked them on
an order of merit list, and then passed the candidate’s
file to the JPB. Three individuals comprised the JPB:
a member of the Liberian government (appointed by
the Minister of Defence), a member of Liberian civil
society (also appointed by the Minister of Defence),
and a U.S. Embassy official. After the JPB reviewed
the applicant’s file, test results, and vetting findings, it
then voted on whether to admit the candidate into the
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new AFL as a recruit. A simple majority won. Rejected applicants could appeal to a similarly constructed
Joint Review Board (JRB), which had final determining authority. Recruits spent the first year of their service on probation, during which their performances
were evaluated. At the end of this first year, the JPB
convened to decide whether to retain or dismiss the
soldier. UNMIL could observe the process but had no
vote. DynCorp only acted as the administrative facilitator and also had no vote.
The recruiting and vetting campaign was fairly
effective, given the high enlistment rate in the first 6
months of recruiting. DynCorp received 4,170 applicants in the first 6 months of recruiting. The average
age was 29 years, and there was a fairly even dispersion of tribal group. No single group accounted for
more than 12 percent of the applicant pool, although
some groups represented less than 1 percent, such
as Sarpo, Bella, and Dei.86 No one was identified as
Americo-Liberian or Congo, though .8 percent did
not select a group on the enlistment application form,
which asks individuals to identify their tribe rather
than ethnic group. Neither Americo-Liberians nor
Congo regard themselves as a tribe.
Two-thirds of all applicants resided in the county
of Montserrado, where Monrovia is located, though
because the war drove most of Liberia’s population to
its capital, this should not be interpreted as reflecting
applicants’ counties of origin. Most candidates were
born in Montserrado (22 percent), Lofa (16 percent), or
Nimba (14 percent), while the fewest came from River
Gee (2 percent), Gbarpolu (1 percent), and Rivercess
(1 percent). In general, the applicants were representative of the population, consistent with the DoS and
the Liberian government’s desire for an ethnically
balanced military.
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Curiously, only 772 applicants, or 18.5 percent of
the applicant pool, claimed former military experience, either in the AFL or a rebel group. No doubt some
withheld this information when applying, especially
during the early days of recruitment when the SSR
program’s reputation was still inchoate. Over half of
these applicants claimed they served in the AFL, with
the remainder more or less evenly divided among former LURD, MODEL, militia, and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, a rebel group led by Taylor during
the First Liberian Civil War from 1989 to 1996. A small
number of candidates claimed they served in special
units created by Taylor towards the end of the war
that terrorized the population and enemy alike, such
as the Special Operations Division and Special Secret
Service. No applicant was denied entry into the new
AFL because they were part of a notorious unit; candidates were only rejected when background checks
revealed participation in human rights violations or
crimes. Applicants with former military experience
scored substantially lower on vetting benchmarks
than applicants without former military experience.
Both the Liberian government and the DoS had
asked DynCorp to emphasize female recruitment, and
in 2006, Johnson-Sirleaf astonishingly declared that
20 percent of all soldiers in the AFL should be women, perhaps the highest percentage of women in any
military.87 DynCorp correspondingly held women-only recruitment days, featured women soldiers in comics and billboards, and hired female veterans of the old
AFL’s Women Auxiliary Corps to staff the AFL information booth in downtown Monrovia. Despite these
efforts, only 130 of the 4,170 applicants were female,
constituting 3.2 percent of the applicant pool. When
asked, one woman said she did not want to join the
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military because it would make her “muscly” and “no
man wants a woman muscly.” When it was pointed
out to her that she—and many women in Liberia—
walked several miles a day with a few gallons of water
or a sack of rice balanced on their head yet remained
“unmuscly,” she simply grinned and left.88
Vetting is an area where the objectives of post-conflict security and justice can clash. Key to the success
of the vetting program was guaranteeing the anonymity of people who gave information about applicants.
Failure to protect the identities of witnesses and victims of crimes invited reprisals and even death: With
a feeble judiciary and scant law enforcement, violence
was never far beneath the surface. However, this was
controversial because it meant that vetting must remain absolutely unconnected to instruments of postconflict justice, such as a truth commission or a war
crimes tribunal.
This became an issue in the summer of 2006 when
Liberia’s nascent Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) demanded all of DynCorp’s vetting records for transitional justice purposes. By this time,
DynCorp had amassed one of the most complete sets
of records on individuals in the country, especially
regarding ex-combatants. Causing controversy within
UNMIL, DynCorp refused to hand over its records,
since it would reveal the identities of witnesses as
well as vetting sources and methods. If the TRC were
to use the vetting records as evidence, making them
public in the process or leaking them by accident,
it would invite reprisals against the witnesses and
also compromise the AFL SSR program, since no one
would volunteer to join if they thought it would land
them in front of the TRC. The objective of vetting is
to assess suitability for service in a security force; it
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is not about determining guilt or innocence, and consequently should be disassociated from transitional
justice efforts.
Clearly, it is desirable that potential perpetrators
of violence be brought before the TRC. However,
sometimes in volatile situations like post-conflict Liberia, the needs of transitional justice and security are
at odds with each other, and leaders must choose between the two. The real tragedy is that the choice must
be made at all, as Liberians deserve both. At the time,
the immediate needs of security outweighed the need
for transitional justice. As a PMC, it was easier for
DynCorp to refuse the TRC than for the U.S. Government to do so, since the United States does not wish
to be publically portrayed as retarding post-conflict
justice, even when it is, at times, necessary. This may
be an instance when plausible deniability afforded by
private companies serves the employer’s interests.
Now that the SSR program is complete, the Liberian government could choose to release the vetting
records. As long as the TRC is not politicized, such an
action could prove an important confidence building
measure for the public and the AFL’s final step in becoming a full-fledged transparent army governed by
civilian authorities and accountable to the rule of law.
It would help dispel mistrust that the records are being concealed to protect the guilty, and that this AFL
was truly “new,” removing the taint of the civil war
once and for all.
Step 4: Training and Equipping.
Training and equipping the force is the simplest
part of building an army. Although military training
varies from place to place, the principles involved
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in transforming civilians into soldiers are so timeless that they are practically clichés: intense physical
conditioning and psychological hardening; breaking
down individual egos and building them back up as
a unit; bonding through mutual suffering; the more
the recruits sweat in peace, the less they bleed in war;
repetitive drills until soldiers can literally accomplish
military tasks in their sleep. The foundational document of U.S. Army training—and now AFL training—is U.S. Army Regulation 350–1: Army Training and
Leader Development (AR 350-1). DynCorp adopted the
U.S. Army’s initial entry training (IET) program for
the AFL’s basic training, modifying it for the needs of
Liberia, and hired only ex-U.S. Army and Marine drill
sergeants (see Figure 11) to transform the recruits into
soldiers.89

Figure 11. AFL Basic Training with a
DynCorp Drill Sergeant.
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Grounded in AR 350-1, DynCorp planned four
training courses for the AFL. Basic training—that is,
IET—initially lasted 15 weeks but later was reduced
due to lack of funding. Following this, recruits would
undergo advanced individual training (AIT), which
usually lasted 6 weeks and provided specialized
training to soldiers based on their military occupation
speciality (MOS), such as infantry, medic, or cook. Every member of the AFL undertook IET and AIT, but
soldiers selected for leadership underwent additional
training. Those selected as noncommissioned officers
(NCOs, also known as sergeants) attended a basic
NCO course (BNCOC, pronounced bee-knock) for 4
weeks, and those selected as officers attended an officer basic course (OBC) for 6 weeks. Rather than examine each of these courses in depth, it may prove more
useful to analyze one course, basic training, because
it was the most widely attended and illustrates how
DynCorp adapted U.S. military training to the AFL’s
unique needs.
The original basic training program was revolutionary. Early planners at DynCorp believed that after
14 years of civil war, most Liberians knew how to fire
an AK-47 but did not know when or at what. Thus, the
original basic training curriculum and first iteration
reduced the number of hours AFL recruits spent on
the range and added 3 weeks’ worth of civics classes,
which taught the laws of war, ethics, and the like. The
curriculum was designed in partnership with Liberian
lawyers, historians, and educators, as well as DynCorp staff with backgrounds in international public
law and military training. The 120 hours of civics instruction dwarfed all other training, with basic rifle
marksmanship (BRM) coming in a distant second at
under 50 hours. The firm also partnered with interna-
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tional NGOs such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) to deliver 8 hours of instruction
on international humanitarian law and human rights.
At the time, the volume of civics instruction was unprecedented in modern militaries, but few modern
militaries face the challenges of the AFL.
Additionally, the civics instruction addressed vital
concerns of the AFL such as federalism. As in most
fragmented states, people in Liberia often identified
first with their tribe and second with their state, which
had corrupted the national military. As mentioned
previously, Doe had replaced much of the AFL leadership with members of his Krahn tribe, turning the
military into a sectarian war machine in the 1980s. To
avoid this in the future, the Liberian government and
the DoS demanded that DynCorp create an AFL with
balanced ethnic representation in the ranks and also a
strong national identity that superseded tribal loyalty.
To answer its client’s demands, DynCorp dedicated
significant time in the civics section to Liberian history, loyalty to the constitution, organization of the Liberian government, the civil-military relationship, the
rule of law, and other topics that imbued a national
consciousness and duty to state above all else.90 Designed and often delivered by Liberian professional
educators, this curriculum aspired to engender respect for federalism within the ranks.
Another key challenge facing the AFL was literacy.
Military leaders and ideally the entire force would be
literate. But Liberia’s high illiteracy rate, combined
with Taylor’s denial of education to his tribal enemies
during the war, meant that some ethnic groups were
less literate than others. This created a conundrum,
since the DoS gave DynCorp the dual mandate of a
literate and ethnically balanced military. To overcome

86

this, DynCorp accepted some candidates from minority groups with lower literacy rates and embedded
a literacy program into basic training for any recruit
wanting or needing it.
Infusing civics, federalism, and literacy instruction
into the overall basic training framework is an excellent example of private sector innovation not found
in similar public sector efforts. U.S. efforts at raising
security forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mali faced
similar hurdles as were seen in Liberia, yet lacked any
sort of systematic approach to instilling federalism,
literacy, or respect for the rule of law.
This failure stems, in part, from the U.S. military’s
reluctance to abandon its doctrine when restructuring
security forces, often to the detriment of those foreign
forces—and unfortunately, like the market for force
in the Middle Ages, the contractor is only as good as
the client. After the first iteration of basic training, the
DoS asked DynCorp to remove the 3 weeks of civics
courses on advice from the DoD and to save money.
Therefore, it is difficult to assess the efficacy of DynCorp’s civics program.
To save money, the DoS chose to shorten basic
training by 3 weeks, which it did by removing all civics, human rights, and laws of war classes—perhaps
the most important training for the new AFL, since
most recruits already knew how to shoot an AK-47
from the war. Industry critics might find this surprising, naturally assuming that the DoS would want the
civics curriculum and that the PMC would have no
interest in implementing it, which if true, would have
been a classic case of the profit motive overriding
policy concerns.
In terms of equipping the recruits, conflict-zone
logistics is the private military industry’s forte, as
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contractors manage the majority of DoD logistics requirements around the world. DynCorp’s team of
ex-military and civilian logisticians at the company’s
offices in Dallas equipped the AFL through the global
supply chain. Since Liberia was under a strict UN arms
embargo at the time, the DoS and DynCorp worked
together closely in 2006 to purchase small arms in
Eastern Europe and fly the weapons to Liberia via
chartered cargo plane. To minimize ambush by clandestine rebel groups, the planes landed unannounced
in the dead of night. The DoS arranged an exemption
to the UN arms embargo, over-flight permissions,
end user certificates, and money for the operation.
DynCorp found the supplier, transacted the deal, and
moved the weapons from Eastern Europe to Liberia.
The deal was the first legal arms transaction to Liberia
in nearly 2 decades.
Step 5: Strategy and Institutional Support.
It takes more than soldiers and weapons to make
an army. Therefore, DynCorp was also contracted to
demobilize and rebuild the Ministry of Defence to
develop defense strategy and manage the AFL’s human resources, public affairs, resource management,
ombudsman, coordination with other ministries, and
other vital functions. Because ministries of defense in
fragile states are often bloated affairs, the DoS directed
the company to create a lean organization of about 100
people, almost all civilians and led by a civilian minister. Once AFL recruiting and training was underway,
DynCorp undertook the creation of a small military
civil service.
Rebuilding a ministry is far from a facile affair.
Public sector militaries like the U.S. Army generally
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do not conduct institutional reform, as it is not seen
as a core military function. Instead, development
agencies such as USAID or the World Bank typically
assist host nations with the work. However, development organizations are often prohibited from working
with military institutions or shun doing so, and consequently transforming a ministry of defense in particular remains largely unmapped territory.91 This did
not deter DynCorp, which sought out relevant experts
and lured them to Liberia through competitive pay
packages in a manner no state bureaucracy can afford
or has the flexibility to accommodate. Because practice
was ahead of theory in 2005, many of the experts were
retired U.S. military officers and defense attachés with
substantial experience working with African ministries of defense.
Within months, the firm formed a 20-person team
that devised a 17-week civil servant training course
divided into 10 functional areas, followed by 16 weeks
of on-the-job mentorship.92 The team also would help
the fledgling Liberian ministry draft all plans, policies,
and procedures for the AFL—a major task—as well as
assist in formulating military strategy. Unfortunately,
this plan never came to fruition due to contractual pay
problems, so it is impossible to assess its effectiveness,
although it could serve as a useful model for future
efforts. Today the Ministry of Defence has mostly
learned by doing, a less than ideal approach to ministerial development.
One interesting aspect of hiring a private company
to conduct SSR rather than the DoD is that DynCorp
was not beholden to any country’s military doctrine
or textbook solutions. Instead, it could freely mold
existing protocols without fear of institutional reprisal. Substantially modifying doctrine to fit the needs
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of a host nation is a departure from the U.S. practice,
which, as recent experience suggests, tends to transpose—wholesale—its own military models onto foreign forces without consideration as to whether they
are appropriate or not. Not surprisingly, these efforts meet limited success: U.S. solutions to Iraqi or
Afghani problems have made for a poor fit. By contrast, in Liberia, DynCorp used U.S. Army training
doctrine as a baseline for innovation rather than as an
outright solution.
Additionally, DynCorp’s bureaucratic outsider
status allowed it to support Liberia’s interests in the
back offices of the Pentagon and the DoS in Washington, DC, where Liberians could seldom venture. It became evident during the consultations that Liberians
strongly advocated gender equality in the ranks, while
the U.S. Government did not. Before the civil war, the
AFL had an all-female unit called the Women’s Auxiliary Corps, which was well respected even in 2005,
and during the civil war, some of the most feared warlords, such as Black Diamond, were women. Liberians
understood that women could be effective warriors.
However, until recently the U.S. military held that
women were not fit for combat and therefore should
not serve in front-line units, and it initially opposed
including women in AFL infantry units.
DynCorp thus became an unwitting arbitrator in a
debate between the defense establishments in Washington, DC, and Monrovia. As a nominal outsider in
the process, DynCorp could credibly present ideas
and recommendations to entrenched bureaucracies
on both sides of the Atlantic without the burdens of
institutional loyalty or prejudice. This helped drive
the argument for gender parity, since key managers
in DynCorp were persuaded by the Liberians’ case.
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Because the DoS managed the SSR contract, it had the
final vote on the matter and opted for gender parity,
overruling the DoD desire to use U.S. military templates and its bias against women in infantry units.
Consequently, Liberian women may now enjoy greater equality in their military than do American women.
By 2010, Liberia had a small fledgling army and,
in 2013, it is preparing to possibly deploy to Mali for
a peacekeeping mission, 10 years after Charles Taylor
fled Liberia, and the AFL was widely viewed as a cause
of conflict. It remains a qualified success compared to
efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, Côte d’Ivoire,
and elsewhere where new security forces degenerated
into sectarian killing machines or coup d’etat makers.
One of the features that makes Liberia unique is that a
PMC raised its army, revealing some of the good, bad,
and ugly implications of today’s private military industry and the future of DDR and SSR, since many of
these programs will likely be outsourced in the future.
Other Challenges.
As with any complex contingency operations, few
things went as planned. Two especially difficult challenges for the operator on the ground are discussed.
Erratic Funding.
The United States paid for the SSR program, except for the soldiers’ salaries, making progress vulnerable to the ebb and flow of DoS funding.93 Money for
the DDR of 13,770 legacy soldiers was scarce, delaying their demobilization and placing the entire SSR effort—and arguably the country—in peril. In late April
2006, 400 to 500 former AFL soldiers conducted a vio-
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lent protest outside the Ministry of Defence, claiming
nonpayment of salary arrears and retirement benefits,
and clashed with UNMIL peacekeepers sent to quell
the unrest.94
Erratic funding to other parts of the program resulted in inchoate outcomes. The Ministry of Defence
reform program was prematurely terminated after the
completion of a 17-week civil servant training course
but before the implementation of a planned 5-month
mentoring and on-the-job training phase. Consequently, new civil servants had no source of advice or
assistance as they assumed their official duties in the
new ministry, rendering it severely incapacitated.95
Lapses in client funding and Liberian capacity also
created dangerous situations. Training was stopped
for months due to lack of payment by the DoS, leaving
new soldiers to sit idle while they waited for follow-on
recruits to fill out their units. Making matters worse,
the Ministry of Finance still did not have the capacity
to pay soldiers in 2006, demonstrating that in recovering failed states, all institutions must work together.
This created the dangerous situation of unpaid and
disgruntled soldiers that the SSR program sought to
avoid from the outset.
Meanwhile, those ready to report to basic training were literally told, “Don’t call us, we’ll call you,”
by frustrated SSR program staff. The program then
consisted of nearly 100 international (U.S. and thirdcountry national personnel combined) and several
hundred local national staff. Sending the international staff home and furloughing the local staff to save
money would cause resentment among the locals, given Liberia’s 75 percent unemployment rate, and many
of the international staff were specialists who were
difficult to replace.
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Frustrated and fearing that it might have to leave
Liberia for lack of payment—an option few public
armies would consider—DynCorp urged its client to
stabilize the funding stream. The high cost of paying
expensive employees to sit idle in a country where the
average person subsisted on $1.25 a day sent a cynical
message to the population, already somewhat dubious over the new AFL. Also, it created a dangerous
situation in an unstable state, as DynCorp was unable to store weapons and ammunition safely without
an armory, which PA&E was scheduled to build but
could not, because of lack of money. Worse, soldiers
who completed training would have no military base
to report to, as PA&E had yet to complete bases. This
could prove a perilous situation for Liberian society
and discredit the entire SSR program. As Mark Malan
noted, “Weak and erratic funding from the U.S. Department of State is the main cause of the slow pace of
AFL development.”96
Local Ownership and Contractors.
“Local ownership” has become a mantra in the international development community; it refers to local
political and popular support for foreign assistance
programs like SSR, and there is a growing consensus
among scholars that early local ownership is crucial to
program sustainability and legitimacy.97 The concept
is simple enough: A foreign power that wields a heavy
hand in transforming another country will likely
alienate the very people it aspires to benefit, negating
the purpose of the program. Or, as Laurie Nathan explains, “Experience shows that reform processes will
not succeed in the absence of commitment and ownership on the part of those undertaking reforms.”98
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Because the AFL SSR process relied heavily on U.S.
support, some scholars assert it lacks ownership, sustainability, and legitimacy.99 Morten Bøås and Karianne Stig sum up this collective critique when they
claim that the lack of transparency, accountability,
and participation of local Liberians in the SSR process
led to a paucity of ownership of the program.100 Even
the U.S. Congressional Research Service questions
the balance between foreign support for and national
ownership of security in Liberia and worries that lack
of adequate public input has created an AFL where
“political legitimacy might be called into question.”101
Contractors compound the quandary of ownership because, as Adedeji Ebo reasons, “There is no
direct contractual obligation between the security
contractor and the institutions and people of the reforming state.”102 Not even the Liberian Minister of
Defence had a copy of DynCorp’s contract to transform the AFL he was to lead, demonstrating a lack of
transparency in the process. This created a problematic situation. Liberians were neither an employer nor
a signatory to the contract, even though they were the
intended beneficiaries of the program. Consequently,
the Liberian government had only limited ability to
direct DynCorp; the company, in essence, was not
accountable to the state, even as it was rebuilding its
military forces. For Bøås and Stig, “This clearly represents a democratic deficit in the SSR.”103
However, critics’ conclusions may be overstated.
Few Liberians seemed concerned about the U.S. role in
the AFL SSR process, especially given the urgent need
for military reform and the strong historical ties between the two countries. Nor were Liberians troubled
by the presence of contractors: There were no riots,
protests, violence, or other evidence of widespread
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PMC rejection. DynCorp’s frequent overtures to civil
society—almost always through the government of
Liberia—were met with general disinterest. The Liberian Minister of Defence had multiple occasions to join
DynCorp on its recruitment trips starting in 2006, but
chose not to accompany the firm until 2008.104 Additionally, the NTGL—and not DynCorp—determined
who was eligible for demobilization benefits and who
would be admitted into the new AFL. This indicates a
lack of worry on the Liberian government’s part rather
than a failure of transparency on DynCorp’s, as more
recent scholarship confirms:
The Liberian Ministry of Defence, the legislature and
civil society have had opportunities to involve themselves more in the reform than they have done, thus
suggesting that the reform is not proceeding as such
a closed process as previous research on the SSR has
argued.105

Other problems undermine academic critiques over
ownership. Can foreign scholars really speak for Liberians on the question of local ownership? Can outside
observers claim Liberia had no ownership of AFL SSR
if its government had approved and accepted a gratis
program that the United States provided through its
contractors?106 Can simultaneous assertions that there
was no local ownership and that ownership is necessary for success be made if Liberians have not rejected
the AFL, and it is a success compared to the Liberian
National Police and other elements of the security sector? On this last point, the ICG describes progress in
Liberia’s security sector reform as “uneven”: While
“the police are still widely considered ineffective and
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corrupt. . . . Army reform appears to be a provisional
success.”107
Other researchers are more harsh in their critique
of contractors in Liberia, inferring that they are mercenaries. As Malan writes, “In a country and region
where recent history has been shaped by warlords and
mercenaries, the U.S. Department of State has shown
remarkable insensitivity by sending in contractors
to shape the new army.”108 Unfortunately, Malan offers no further explanation or support for this serious
claim. Comparing DynCorp to Liberian warlords and
mercenaries without supporting evidence is irresponsible and absurd.
The concept of local “ownership” sits well among
academics and policymakers, but the reality on the
ground is more nuanced: How precisely does one
translate this principle into practice? What does local
ownership exactly look like? How do you know when
you have achieved sufficient ownership? Even the
definition of local ownership is disputed: Who gets to
decide who the key stakeholders are when determining local ownership? Choosing which local leaders
and political groups will represent local aspirations is
difficult and fraught with uncertainty, and has political ramifications both within indigenous and international politics. Also, local actors often have competing
visions and priorities, and selecting local partners can
be perilous in conflict-affected countries where there
is often imperfect knowledge of parochial agendas.
It may prove difficult to keep insurgents and spoilers
out of the process, and if they are deemed key stakeholders, it provides them a platform of legitimacy and
the ability to obstruct progress from within, while
making it difficult to expel them. Finally, measuring
ownership is difficult. What exactly does one measure? Should metrics privilege local values and priori96

ties or international ones? Local ownership is sound in
theory but nebulous in practice.
CONCLUSION
In 2003, Charles Taylor fled to Nigeria, ending a
14-year civil war that left the country post-apocalyptic
and the population traumatized. It became home to
the world’s largest UN peacekeeping missions at the
time that Nigeria began the hard work of resuscitating
the country. Due to historical ties, the United States
agreed to demobilize and rebuild the AFL, which
was complicit in war crimes. In an interesting twist,
the DoS outsourced this task to the private sector,
the first time in 150 years that one sovereign hired a
private company to raise another sovereign’s military. This is also significant because the private sector
will likely play an increasing role in building security
forces in the future, making Liberia a particularly apt
case study.
Liberia, and particularly the AFL, is an instructive case study of DDR and SSR since it is a qualified
success. It bridges the theory and practice behind the
DDR of Liberia’s legacy military and SSR that built
a new one. Regardless of the size of the country or
the security forces—from Liberia to Afghanistan—
the fundamental machinations of DDR and SSR are
the same.
DDR and SSR are important because they are gateway programs. In fragile states, the construction or
reconstruction of the security sector is a precondition
for development, since no other reform—political,
economic, or social—can take root without security.
Additionally, helping failed states recover is critical to
global security, since they can constitute a chronic in-
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ternational problem; induce regional instability; result
in humanitarian tragedy; provide safe havens, training grounds, and bases of operation for global terrorists; and abet international criminal organizations that
traffic in narcotics, people, small arms, terrorist skills,
weapons of mass destruction, and other illicit products and services. Additionally, a competent indigenous security sector is essential for the exit strategy
from costly peacekeeping missions.
Finally, as with all complex contingency operations, a certain degree of humility is required. As seen
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, excessively ambitious visions of what is achievable often achieve little.
It is far superior to start with a modest vision and
build from there.
Liberia Lessons Learned.
At the International Level:
1. Political agreement. Ensure SSR and DDR have
a clear mandate by including them in the peace agreement.
2. Inclusion of all warring parties. Every group that
is expected to participate in DDR should be included
in the peace agreement.
3. DDR and SSR are linked. They rise or fall together and should be planned, resourced, implemented,
and evaluated as a single entity.
4. Comprehensive and synchronized approach.
DDR and SSR require the close coordination of many
agencies, such as the DoD, DoS, USAID, etc.
5. Sufficient funds and political will. Erratic support may result in a half developed security sector,
which can be worse than none at all.
6. Lose the “train and equip” mentality. SSR is
more than “train and equip” and involves engaging
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civil society, human rights vetting, and transformation across the security sub-sectors, operational actors,
institutional actors, and oversight actors. Training and
equipping alone is necessary but insufficient for SSR.
Host Nation Level: Institutional Actors and
Oversight Actors.
1. All politics are local. DDR and SSR are political programs because they rewire de facto authority
structures in conflict affected states. Consequently,
technical approaches alone will likely fail.
2. Institute security sector management. Transform
institutional and oversight actors, such as ministries,
perhaps even starting with these organizations.
3. Develop a sensible security strategy. Work with
the host nation to develop a National Security Strategy that uniquely addresses root causes of conflict, and
avoid templating other countries’ strategies. In Liberia, the strategy and force structure should be focused
on securing development and good governance rather
than defeating foreign militaries.
4. All institutions must work together. Recognize
that the army cannot get paid if the Ministry of Finance is nonoperational, as this will impact DDR and
SSR success.
5. Instill, when possible, democratic principles; for
example, civilian control of the military.
6. Cultivate professionalism. Transparency in
oversight, accounting, promotion systems, and so
forth will encourage a culture of merit.
7. Eschew ill-fitting doctrinal templates. What
works for the United States may not work for the
host nation.
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Host Nation Level: Operational Actors.
1. Sensitize the population to what is going on.
Not everyone will welcome ex-combatants into their
hometowns or the creation of a new army or police
force, especially if the legacy forces were complicit in
crimes.
2. Spoilers. Be inclusive in planning and engage
civil society, but manage spoilers effectively. If a spoiler is given a position of authority inside the program,
then the DDR and SSR program may be undermined.
3. Demobilize with dignity. Combatants are more
likely to cooperate if they are not treated like criminals. However, be prepared for opposition from international and domestic audiences, since many in the
legacy security sector could, in fact, be criminals.
4. It may be necessary to start over. Avoid lustration and demobilize the entire force since it probably
is not known who is “good” or who is “bad.” UNMIL
used lustration to rebuild the Liberian National Police, which was unsuccessful and remains an obstacle
to stability.
5. Vigorously vet all candidates. The United States
would never put a cop on the street or enlist someone
for the military without a thorough background check.
To not sufficiently vet individuals in conflict countries
is unacceptable. Use a “balance of probabilities” standard of evidence when adjudicating applicants’ files.
6. Instill professional values. Starting in basic training, instill respect for the rule of law, human rights
norms and international humanitarian law, and allegiance to the constitution, rather than to an individual
leader, in all training.
7. Force Structure is key. The force structure and
security architecture must reflect the country’s needs.
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It should have a defense-oriented posture with limited force-projection capability: limited artillery, armor,
intelligence, and fighter aircraft. Covert special operations units and their kindred should be avoided, since
they tend to become manipulated by political factions,
as was the case with police in East Timor.
8. Size is constrained by the government’s ability
to pay salaries. Force size should be determined by the
host government’s ability to pay salaries over the long
term since unpaid soldiers are often a greater threat to
insecurity than foreign invasion. This should be a core
planning constraint when designing an SSR program.
9. A smaller, well-trained, volunteer force is preferable. It is easier to instill discipline andprofessionalism in a small force than in a larger one.
10. The force should mirror society. The new force
should be inclusive of all groups, ethnicities, and
women. This will help ensure it does not become a
sectarian instrument of power, as the AFL was under
Doe’s regime. Create an ombudsman or similar office
to mediate ethnic disputes within the ranks.
11. Selection for leadership is difficult. It takes 20
years to achieve the rank of colonel in the U.S. Army,
yet conflict countries cannot wait that long. New forces like the AFL will initially be an “army of privates.”
The international partner may recommend senior
leaders, but the host nation must select them. Beware
of cronyism and nepotism.
12. Literacy is important. Leaders need to read and
write orders. It may be necessary to include literacy
courses in basic training.
13. Be aware of inherent dilemmas. For example,
sometimes one must choose between security versus
development. In DDR, do you grant amnesty to potential war criminals to encourage them to participate
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in the program? In SSR, do you turn over vetting records to a TRC, risking reprisals against witnesses
who spoke with the vetting teams? Another example:
Do you prioritize ethnic inclusion or literacy? An ethnically balanced force is a guiding principle of SSR,
yet in places like Liberia, some ethnic groups were
denied access to education and were functionally illiterate. Building a literacy program into the training, as
was the case in Liberia, helps mitigate this challenge,
but such programs cannot lift an individual from a 6th
to 12th grade reading level in a few months.
14. Contractors are good if you know how to manage them. DynCorp invested in innovative ideas like
human security and created a unique human rights
vetting program because it was not beholden to the
bureaucracy and was motivated by profit to innovate.
However, it may have overstepped its bounds due to
poor government oversight on the ground. Harness
the power of the private sector but develop the management skills to do so.
15. Lastly, be humble. SSR is a marathon and not
a sprint. It involves political bargaining, operational
surprises, and imperfect outcomes. Ensure expectations are managed, especially one’s own.
Six Recommendations for the U.S. Army.
The U.S. Army has long been associated with Liberia’s military, given the historical ties between the
two countries. It helped establish the Liberia Frontier
Force in 1908, Liberia’s first national security force
and forerunner of the AFL. Composed of 500 men
and later led by American army officers, its mission
was originally “to patrol the borders in the hinterland
[against British and French territorial expansion] and
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to prevent disorder.” U.S. military advisors continued
to work closely with the Liberian armed forces during
the interwar years and Cold War.
Despite the U.S. Army’s long history of military
assistance in Liberia and elsewhere, conceptual understanding of SSR remains limited, and many still
view SSR activities as a second order mission. Such an
approach is strategically myopic, given the expanding
threat-set of transnational actors, civil war, and spillover from conflict affected states. Unless the United
States wishes to deploy American boots on the ground
to every strategic hot spot in the world, it needs to
buttress allies’ security sectors to deal with emerging
problems before they become crises. DDR and SSR are
tools that accomplish this, and the U.S. Army should
hone these instruments since partners’ land forces
typically deal with most threats. Here are six recommendations that will help the U.S. Army improve this
skill set.
1. Break the “train and equip” mentality regarding
SSR. Historically, the U.S. Army largely treated the
formation of foreign forces as a foreign internal defense (FID) mission. FID is an ill-fitting model for SSR;
it is a Cold War concept informed by Maoist irregular
warfare operations rather than SSR principles. In a
traditional FID mission, special forces units covertly
train and equip pro-American guerrillas in communist
countries (e.g., the Montagnards in Vietnam) and help
friendly governments defeat communist insurgents
(e.g., El Salvador) in proxy wars between the United
States and Soviet Union. These were essentially tactical train and equip missions that did not entail institution building, much less wholesale SSR, as is required
in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately,
many national security thinkers remain paradigm
prisoners of the “train and equip” mentality, often cit103

ing as SSR progress the number of indigenous soldiers
or police trained and equipped—a clever metric that
never diminishes (hence insinuates progress) nor tells
you anything about the quality of the security forces
being produced. Training and equipping only produces better dressed soldiers who shoot straighter; it
does not create an army.
2. The U.S. Army must balance its SSR efforts between operational and institutional actors. Because of
the “train and equip” mentality, the military has traditionally emphasized generating indigenous “boots
on the ground” at the expense of civil servants in ministries. However, an army of infantry squads without
the requisite institutional backing is merely a militia.
This unbalanced approach undermines the hard-won
tactical gains that must be sustained by a partner
state’s defense institutions. Contractors are capable
of filling this gap as they did in Liberia, but the U.S.
Army should have an organic capacity to conduct this
mission and not overly depend on the private sector
to provide SSR. One promising development is the
Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program. Established in 2010, it allows the U.S. Army to draw on
civilian expertise to transform ministerial actors, and
it should be expanded.
3. Draft mature doctrine on DDR and SSR. Currently, there are no doctrine or field manuals (FMs)
dedicated to these operations despite the fact that the
U.S. Army has been actively engaged in DDR and SSR
undertakings in Iraq and Afghanistan for 10 years.
Doctrine is needed because, as this monograph demonstrates, these are complex tasks requiring a comprehensive approach well beyond “train and equip”
methodologies. Unfortunately, most SSR related doctrine remains mired in this tactical approach to SSR:
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Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense; U.S. Army
and U.S. Marine Corps FM 3-24/MCWP3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, chap. 6; and U.S. Army FM 3-07, Stability
Operations, chap. 6. After several years of FID failure in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military finally drafted
more inclusive doctrine on SSR called security force
assistance: U.S. Army FM 3-07/1, Security Force Assistance. Though a significant improvement, this model
does not address the full spectrum of SSR needs, such
as human rights vetting, and creates foreign militaries
in the image of the U.S. Army, which is inappropriate.
The U.S. Army should develop doctrine and publish
a field manual dedicated to DDR and SSR as linked,
modular, and scalable programs that can be tailored
to unique host nation needs. Good doctrine should
scope and frame ideas to make them operational and
avoid what Frances Z. Brown, a development expert,
terms “romantic capacity-building projects.”109
4. Link security with justice. A U.S. congressional
investigation into a $2.16 billion contract called Host
Nation Trucking, which protects overland supply
lines in Afghanistan, found that many subcontractors
hired to provide armed protection of the trucking convoys were Afghan warlords and their militia. In some
ways, this arrangement worked well: It effectively
supplied most U.S. combat outposts across difficult
and hostile terrain, while only rarely needing the assistance of U.S. troops. However, the report, Warlord,
Inc., also discovered that:
the principal private security subcontractors on the
[Host Nation Trucking] contract are warlords, strongmen, commanders and militia leaders who compete
with the Afghan central government for power and
authority. Providing “protection” services for the
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United States supply chain empowers these warlords
with money, legitimacy, and a raison d’etre for their
private armies.110

Empowering local warlords, thugs, criminals, and
others reviled by the local population compromises
the larger aims of the mission: building a just society
that upholds the rule of law. As the congressional report concluded, “The logistics contract has an outsized
strategic impact on U.S. objectives in Afghanistan.”111
5. The United States needs a Stability Police Force
or similar instrument to accomplish DDR and SSR.
Core to SSR is policing because it has the power to
prevent conflicts, preserve social stability during crises, and support post-conflict rehabilitation. Policing
is also critical for development. According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), “Effective policing helps create an environment where sustainable development can flourish.”112
Yet the United States lacks an expeditionary police
force, probably because there is no national police
force to draw from, and prefers to rely on contractors like DynCorp International for police in stability operations. But depending on contractors makes
the United States overly exposed to the private sector
for success in DDR and SSR. Instead, the U.S. Army
should create an organic capacity by expanding the
Military Police Corps to include these functions or instituting an expeditionary Stability Police Force.
6. Do no harm. On May 29, 2006, bloody riots tore
through Kabul, the deadliest street violence since the
defeat of the Taliban. In response, the U.S. military
and Afghan authorities created an elite gendarmerie
called the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police
(ANCOP). The U.S. military recruited from among
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the top officers currently serving in the Afghan Uniformed Police, depleting it of its best and brightest. A
key criterion for selection was a 6th-grade level of literacy, an extremely high standard since more than 80
percent of the police were functionally illiterate. However, the inclusion of only literate police officers in
ANCOP had unintended consequences for the overall
police development program. Withdrawal of the few
literate members from nearly every police unit in the
country deprived those units of essential personnel.
Worse, there was no way to replace this capacity since
there was no force-wide literacy training program, as
there was in Liberia. ANCOP soon suffered the curse
of competence and was overutilized, resulting in high
attrition levels and a brain drain to the overall detriment of the Afghan National Police.113 Like war itself,
building security forces is complex and risks unintended consequences.
Stability operations have become an inescapable
reality of U.S. foreign policy, and key to mission success is DDR and SSR. Assisting strategic allies improve their military capabilities serves U.S. national
interest because it enables partners to engage regional
threats so that U.S. troops do not have to engage. Also,
helping a fragile state establish the monopoly of force
to uphold its rule of law strengthens it and promotes
durable development, since a wanton security sector tends to devour the fruits of development. Lastly,
building professional indigenous security forces is the
exit strategy for costly stability operations and peacekeeping missions because it allows the host nation to
secure itself.
In sum, DDR and SSR is a strategic imperative that
has long been neglected despite its centrality to mis-
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sions like Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It must
not remain so. The United States must develop a solid
capability to build better armies, or it will remain
mired in conflict affected countries like Afghanistan
or face strategic surprises in places like Mali.
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crime. Even amenities such as potable water, electricity, and shelter cannot be assumed. Staff must be prepared for possible lack of
cooperation from authorities, the novelty of the procedure for the
population, absence of precedents, and cultural misunderstandings that could be disastrous. In light of this backdrop, DynCorp’s
achievements are all the more notable.
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ANNEX
LIBERIA MILITARY PROGRAM TIMELINE

January 2003

DynCorp International (DynCorp) and Pacific Architects and Engineers
(PA&E) are both awarded a State Department 5-year IDIQ contract to support
peacekeeping and security efforts in Africa (contract solicitation number
S-LMAQM-03-C-0034). Its minimum guaranteed expenditure is $5 million
and maximum is $100 million, later expanded to $500 million.

August 2003

Charles Taylor flees Liberia, and 1,000 ECOWAS peacekeepers and 200
U.S. troops arrive. The interim government and rebels sign the CPA. Gyude
Bryant is chosen to head the NTGL under the title “Chairman” rather than
“President.”

September–
October 2003

U.S. forces pull out, and UNMIL begins the peacekeeping mission, deploying
thousands of troops and encompassing the ECOWAS forces.

December 2003

UNMIL begins DDRR for rebel combatants only. AFL personnel are disarmed,
but not demobilized, rehabilitated, and reintegrated. After riots at one DDRR
site, UNMIL shuts down the program.

January 2004

U.S. sends a six-person SSR pre-assessment team to Liberia, January 21–29.
The U.S. is responsible for the SSR of the AFL, as agreed to at Accra during
peace talks. The DoS is the lead agency within the U.S. Government.

February 2004

International donors pledge more than $500 million in reconstruction aid to
Liberia.

April 2004

UNMIL commences the DDRR process, and it continues without serious
incident. UNMIL also begins SSR for civilian elements of the security sector,
such as the Liberian national police. The DoS plans an SSR assessment
mission to Liberia involving DoS, DoD, and contractors.

May 2004

DoS leads a 10-day assessment mission of SSR for the AFL. The team
consists of experts drawn from DoS, DoD, and two contractor teams:
DynCorp and PA&E. Additionally, PA&E subs MPRI because of its PMC
expertise (PA&E is a GC firm whereas DynCorp and MPRI are PMCs with
relevant SSR expertise). DDR of the AFL is not considered because the NTGL
is responsible for this. A member of the assessment team is murdered in his
hotel room while being robbed.

June 2004

DoD determines it cannot conduct the SSR program, and the DoS decides to
outsource the SSR program entirely to the private sector. Accordingly, it asks
both DynCorp and PA&E to submit their assessments and recommendations
for SSR.
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July 2004

After reviewing the assessments, DoS decides to divide SSR responsibilities
between the two companies based on their expertise. DynCorp is responsible
for reconstituting the AFL and MOD. PA&E is tasked with constructing
most of the military bases and also providing specialty training, equipment,
logistics, and base services.

September 2004

DoS tenders a task order RFP and SOW to DynCorp and PA&E entitled
“Liberia Security Sector Reform.” The SOW states that they must create a
2,000-person military, scalable to 4,300 personnel if funding permits, and an
MOD.

October 2004

DynCorp and PA&E submit their proposals to DoS on October 7. DoS awards
the task order to both companies with a division of labor as outlined in July.
DynCorp is required to be on the ground initially, with PA&E to follow once
sufficient units are fielded. Riots in Monrovia leave 16 people dead; UNMIL
says former combatants and AFL veterans were behind the violence.

January 2005

DoS authorizes DynCorp to deploy a small planning team to Liberia to engage
stakeholders and design the SSR program. It becomes clear that the NTGL
lacks the capacity to conduct DDR of the AFL, and DoS asks DynCorp to take
on this task. UNMIL imposes a curfew on several southeastern provinces
owing to ritual human sacrifices and cannibalism, including the involvement
of provincial governors.

February-March
2005

Consultations are held with major stakeholders regarding the mission and
composition of the future AFL. This includes civil society, the standing AFL,
former warring parties and political factions, UNMIL, the NTGL, civil society
through the NTGL, and other entities. A comprehensive recruiting and vetting
plan is devised intended to screen out human rights abusers from joining the
AFL.

April 2005

The NTGL releases its AFL Restructuring Policy. Consultations with
stakeholders continue. Topics include mission and force structure of the
future AFL, location of training bases, sensitization campaign for civil society,
and arrears owed unpaid AFL veterans.

May 2005

The demobilization plan is drafted and presented to Chairman Bryant.
He signs Executive Order Number Five on May 15, authorizing the full
demobilization of all legacy AFL units as of June 30, 2005. The DoS issues
DynCorp a formal task order for the demobilization of the AFL, releasing full
payment to the contractor. DynCorp makes preparations for DDR operations
outside of Monrovia and plans to conduct the demobilization, recruiting staff
both locally and internationally, and builds up its program (and presence)
in Liberia. PA&E is to begin its portion of the program once training
commences.
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July 2005

DynCorp builds a demobilization site outside Monrovia. The demobilization
and reintegration of the legacy soldiers commences. The U.S. Government
approves DynCorp’s blueprint for the new AFL’s force structure and TO&E in
Washington, DC. Construction of AFL training facilities starts but is slowed by
the heavy rainy season.

September 2005

The NTGL agrees to allow the international community to supervise its
finances in an effort to reduce corruption.

October 2005

Recruiting and vetting for the new AFL begins. Over 12,000 applicants will be
processed in the next 2 years.

November 2005

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf becomes the first woman to be elected as an African
head of state. She takes office the following January.

December 2005

Construction of the new training base remains suspended as Liberia, the
United States, and UNMIL debate over its location, costing the program
money and time.

January 2006

DDR of 13,770 AFL soldiers is completed. Recruiting and vetting begins at
the Barclay Training Center (BTC) in downtown Monrovia. Johnson-Sirleaf is
sworn in as President, and the NTGL is abolished. Brownie Samukai replaces
Daniel Chea as Liberian Minister of Defence.

February 2006

The demobilization of the AFL is successfully completed, perhaps the first
time in modern African history that an entire standing military was safely
demobilized without significant incident.

March 2006

Johnson-Sirleaf calls for Nigeria to hand over Taylor, which it does. Upon
his arrival in Monrovia, he is transferred to the custody of UNMIL and
immediately flown to Sierra Leone to stand trial before the UN-backed Sierra
Leone Special Court on charges of crimes against humanity.

April 2006

MOD transformation begins at BTC. Approximately 400–500 former AFL
soldiers conduct a violent protest outside the MOD, claiming nonpayment of
salary arrears and retirement benefits, and clash with UNMIL peacekeepers
sent to contain the unrest. Taylor appears before the Sierra Leone Special
Court.

May 2006

Samukai spends a week in Washington, DC, with the DoS, DoD, and DynCorp
to discuss the progress of SSR and formulation of the Liberian National
Defence Strategy.
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June 2006

DoS issues an updated SOW. DynCorp assists the MOD in a first draft of
the national defense strategy. It is written based on the concept of human
security, seeking to align the AFL’s mission with the goals of development for
durable stability and security. Progress is limited because the NTGL, UNMIL,
the United States, and others are delayed with the national security strategy.
The UN Security Council eases a ban on weapons sales so that Liberia can
import small arms for government purposes only. An embargo on Liberian
timber exports is lifted shortly afterward. A TRC is set up to investigate
human rights abuses between 1979 and 2003. Tensions transpire between
the TRC and SSR program as the TRC requests access to SSR vetting
records, but the SSR team denies this request since it might compromise
sources and methods, possibly resulting in reprisal killings of victims who
spoke to the SSR vetting team on condition of anonymity about human rights
abuses of some AFL candidates. The ICC at The Hague agrees to host Taylor’s
trial.

July 2006

The first class of AFL basic training or IET begins at BTC. It comprises
110 candidates, most of whom are selected for their potential to fill the
leadership ranks first. The former U.S. Voice of America transmitter site
is finally selected as the AFL’s main training base, located at Careysburg
and rechristened the Sandee S. Ware Military Barracks. DynCorp begins
construction once the occupying UNMIL units move offsite. Construction is
slowed by the heavy rainy season. DynCorp begins the process of purchasing
and importing arms into Liberia for the AFL. President Johnson-Sirleaf
switches on generator-powered street lights in the capital, which has been
without electricity for 15 years.

August 2006

DynCorp orchestrates the first major shipment of arms, which arrives at
Monrovia for the AFL. It is the first legal shipment in over 15 years.

November 2006

The first AFL basic training class of 102 graduates. AFL training of future
classes is halted owing to U.S. funding shortfalls.

March 2007

119 civilian MOD employees graduate from a 17-week SSR program training
course. Following this, the MOD reform program is prematurely terminated
because of U.S. funding shortfalls.

April 2007

The UN Security Council votes to lift its ban on Liberian diamond exports. The
ban was imposed in 2001 to stem the flow of blood diamonds, which helped
fund the civil war.

May 2007

The UN urges Liberia to outlaw trial by ordeal.

June 2007

Taylor’s war crimes trial begins at The Hague, where he stands accused of
instigating atrocities in Sierra Leone.

September 2007

639 total personnel are trained. Owing to cost overruns, DoS shortens IET
from 11 weeks to 8 weeks by cutting 3 weeks that were devoted to human
rights, civics, and laws of war training.
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January 2008

1,124 total personnel are trained.

April 2008

1,634 total personnel are trained.

September 2008

2,113 total personnel are trained.

JanuaryDecember 2009

PA&E conducts unit training for the battalions, culminating in an ARTEP.

December 2009

The TRC releases its final report.

January 2010

DynCorp’s and PA&E’s contract for SSR ends, and a team of 60 U.S. Marines
begin a 5-year mentorship program with the AFL in Operation ONWARD
LIBERTY. In a new task order (worth $20 million if all options are exercised),
DynCorp is selected to provide the AFL with operations and maintenance
services. This task order is awarded under the new 5-year DoS IDIQ contract
called the Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP), contract solicitation
number SAQMMA08R0237. Awardees under AFRICAP include DynCorp
International, PA&E Government Services, AECOM, and Protection Strategies
Incorporated.
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